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CONTENTS

NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.
An Ω indicates a Foreign Media Note.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Bonn Meeting Agrees to Ethnic Partition of B-H *[AFP]* 1

ALBANIA

Berisha Offers To Help FYROM With Blockade *[Tirana Radio]* 2
Ministry Dismisses 'Provocative' FRY Complaint *[AFP]* 2
Pellumbi Addresses Socialist Party Conference *[ZERI I POPULLIT 8 Feb]* 2
Danes To Help Rebuild Health Care System *[Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE 20 Jan]* 12

BULGARIA

Zhelev Dismisses Danger of 'Recommunization' *[Sofia Radio]* 13
DUMA: U.S. Diplomats 'Forming Turkish Axis' 13
Advantages of Partnership for Peace Examined *[24 CHASA 17 Feb]* 14
Commentary Urges Caution Toward Greek Embargo *[KONTINENT 19-20 Feb]* 14
FRY Stance on Recognizing FYROM Viewed *[KONTINENT 17 Feb]* 15

CZECH REPUBLIC

Klaus Expounds on German, Foreign Relations
[Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE 21 Feb] 16
'Freedom Fighters' Insist on Compensation *[CESKY DENIK 16 Feb]* 17
ODA Opposes Proposed Revisions to Constitution *[Prague Radio]* 18
Industrial Espionage Effort Against Tamar Radar *[MLADA FRONTA DNES 15 Feb]* 18
Numbers of AIDS Cases Reported *[Prague TV]* 18

HUNGARY

Smallholders Party Leader Views Elections *[MAGYAR NEMZET 18 Feb]* 19
Ethnic Leaders From Neighboring States Meet *[MAGYAR NEMZET 17 Feb]* 20

POLAND

Kozyrev, Olechowski Discuss NATO, Relations *[PAP]* 23
Delegate Assesses Results of 48th UN Session *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 19-20 Feb]* 24
Foreign Ministry Talks With Russians Reported *[Warsaw Radio]* 25
Sejm Committees Adopt Privatization Report *[PAP]* 25
Sejm Rejects Walesa's Constitutional Proposals *[Warsaw Radio]* 25
Oleksy: No Conflict Between Parliament, President *[Warsaw TV]* 26
Strak Says Draft Constitution 'Badly' Prepared *[Warsaw Radio]* 26
URM Chief on Coalition, PSL, Government *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 21 Feb]* 26
Minister Warns About Impact of Strikes *[Warsaw TV]* 28
Need for Effective Deportation Method Discussed *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 22 Feb]* 29

ROMANIA

Miners Break Off Talks; Cosma To Be Sued *[Bucharest Radio]* 31
Union Leader Pins Hopes on Commission Inquiry *[Bucharest Radio]* 31
PSM, PRM Attacks on Iliescu Examined *[EVENIMENTUL ZILEI 19 Feb]* 31

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Swedish UNPROFOR Troops Near Tuzla Injured *[AFP]* 33
Serb Involvement Not Clear *[Stockholm Radio]* 33
UN 'Very Close' to Air Strikes *[AFP]* 33
'New, Powerful' Serb, Croat Offensive on Maglaj *[Sarajevo Radio]* 33
Volunteers Defending Maglaj *[Sarajevo Radio]* 33
Modern, Russian Arms Arriving in Bosnia *[Sarajevo Radio]* 34
Serbs Reject Conditions for Opening Tuzla Airport *[TANJUG]* 34
Ultimatum 'Unacceptable' to Serbs *[TANJUG]* 34
Serbs Shell Tuzla Airport Area *[Sarajevo Radio]* 35
Report Criticizes Tolerance of Rights Abuses *[AFP]* 35
Silajdzic Interviewed on Ultimatum Results *[Berlin TV]* 35
Conditions Set for EC Administration of Mostar *[Sarajevo Radio]* 36
Mladic Dismisses Rumors About Resignation *[POLITIKA 19 Feb]* 37
Radars Arrive in Sarajevo for Source Detection *[TANJUG]* 37

CROATIA

Serbs Overpower UNPROFOR Troops, Seize Bridge *[AFP]* 38
UNPROFOR To Deploy More Troops *[AFP]* 38
RSK Demands Equipment Withdrawal *[TANJUG]* 38
Army Protests to UNPROFOR Over Serb Shelling *[Zagreb Radio]* 38
Tudjman Criticized for Minimizing WWII Crimes *[TANJUG]* 39
Granic To Meet With Kinkel, Andreatta 23 Feb *[Zagreb Radio]* 39
Markac Appointed Deputy Interior Minister *[Zagreb TV]* 39

THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Crvenkovski Ready for Negotiations With Greece *[AFP]* 40
EU Delegation Arrives in Skopje To Mediate *[AFP]* 40
Greek Embargo Causes Standstill in Border Traffic *[MIC 22 Feb]* 40
'Accusations, Threats' of Ethnic Serbs Viewed *[NOVA MAKEDONIJA 22 Feb]* 40

SLOVENIA

Parliament Caps Funds for Defense Spending *[Ljubljana Radio]* 42
Minister Issues Protest *[Ljubljana Radio]* 42
Maritime Police Impound Croatian Fishing Boat *[Ljubljana Radio]* 42

YUGOSLAVIA

Federal

Prime Minister Discusses 'Useful' Visit to UN *[TANJUG]* 43
Albania's Decision on 'Spy Planes' Protested *[TANJUG]* 43
Nikola Sainovic Appointed Vice President *[TANJUG]* 43
Doctors Warn of 'Devastating' Sanctions *[TANJUG]* 44

Serbia

Draskovic Advocates Extending Sarajevo Model *[Vienna KURIER 23 Feb]* 44

Bonn Meeting Agrees to Ethnic Partition of B-H

AU2202180094 Paris AFP in English 1746 GMT 22 Feb 94

[Excerpts] Bonn, Feb 22 (AFP)—Officials from North America, Western Europe and Russia agreed Tuesday to work together on measures to consolidate and extend the peace achieved around Sarajevo to the rest of Bosnia-Herzegovina, participants said.

Some 30 envoys and senior foreign ministry officials from the United States, Canada, the European Community and Russia proposed ways to bring relief to besieged Moslem enclaves and prevent use elsewhere of Bosnian Serb heavy weapons withdrawn from around the capital, German foreign ministry political director Juergen Chrobog said. [passage omitted]

[Russia's Vitaly] Churkin told reporters: "We know now what we are doing. We are acting together."

Asked if Russia would put pressure on the Serbs, he said that some countries had "special channels" by which to influence the warring parties "for the common good:" the Americans with the Moslems, the Germans with the Croats and the Russians with the Serbs. [passage omitted]

Chrobog said Tuesday's meeting concluded that the European peace plan for the former Yugoslav republic was "quantitatively more or less right" in giving a proposed 33 percent of the republic's territory to the Moslems, but that "qualitatively" there needed to be improvements in besieged Moslem enclaves.

For Sarajevo, the participants agreed the need for consolidation of the peace through demilitarisation, free access for humanitarian aid and a restoration of normal life with UN help, according to a joint statement.

They expressed their "deep concern" regarding the situation in other Bosnian regions, and stressed the need to "concentrate efforts on extending the security zones". They stressed the need to improve conditions for the besieged Moslem population of Maglaj, and called for a rapid reopening of the airport at Tuzla.

Regarding the fighting between Bosnian Moslem and Croat forces, they called for a ceasefire and withdrawal of artillery to allow a return to normal life in Mostar, and an effective ceasefire with a pulling back of the warring parties in central Bosnia.

The meeting was aimed at building on the peace in Sarajevo resulting from the withdrawal, under threat of NATO airstrikes, of the besieging Serb forces' artillery. NATO responded to the shock caused by a presumed Serb shell which killed 68 people and wounded some 200 in a Sarajevo market early February.

Berisha Offers To Help FYROM With Blockade

AU1802172094 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1430 GMT 18 Feb 94

[Text] The president's press and information office has just issued a report on President Berisha's meeting with the Macedonian foreign minister.

Albania is interested in stability in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], President Berisha said at this meeting today. Albania is of the opinion that respect for all the rights of the Albanian population there is a condition for stability. Thus, the census and the opening of the Pedagogical School will be important steps in this direction. On the other hand, Berisha invites Albanian political forces to work for the stability of Macedonia, as this is in their interest, as well as that of the Albanian nation and the whole region.

President Berisha said that by exchanging greetings with President Gligorov, I want to assure you that Albania is ready to cooperate with you to increase the spirit of understanding and cooperation and establish them on sound bases. To overcome the blockade difficulties, Albania offers it all port and transport facilities and hopes that the conflicts between Macedonia and Greece can be overcome through dialogue.

Macedonian Foreign Minister Crvenkovski said that, by conveying President Gligorov's greetings to President Berisha, he would like to express the deep gratitude of our government for the support that Albania has given to Macedonia. We thank you for the facilities that you are creating for us at these difficult moments of the blockade. He again stressed his government's desire to strengthen cooperation with Albania.

Macedonian Foreign Minister Crvenkovski has ended his trip to our country.

Ministry Dismisses 'Provocative' FRY Complaint

AU2202201294 Paris AFP in English 1955 GMT 22 Feb 94

[Text] Tirana, Feb 22 (FP)—Albania has rejected a Yugoslav complaint to the United Nations Security Council accusing Tirana of responsibility for 46 border violations, a Foreign Ministry statement said Tuesday [22 February]. A Yugoslav memorandum handed over to the council on February 12 said Yugoslav border guards had seized large quantities of arms and ammunition carried by Albanian nationals as they tried illegally to cross the border.

Twenty-one Albanians have died in the incidents since the start of last year, according to the ministry here.

The memorandum was "an anti-Albanian document, provocative and full of slander," the ministry said, adding: "The border provocations are part of (Serbian President Slobodan) Milosevic's strategy to create tension and trigger war, and its consequences will be unpredictable."

In its memorandum Belgrade also accused Tirana of supporting secessionist forces in Serbia's southern Kosovo province which is 90 percent ethnic Albanian. But the foreign ministry said Albanians living in Kosovo were "no minority but an entire people living on its own land."

Pellumbi Addresses Socialist Party Conference

AU2202122094 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 8 Feb 94 pp 1-4

[Speech by Socialist Party Deputy Chairman Servet Pellumbi to the Second Socialist Party National Conference in Tirana on 7 February: "The Socialist Party Toward New Developments in Albanian Democracy"]

[Text] Comrade delegates and honored guests: We have gathered at this conference to present our alternatives for government at the present stage of transition and for overcoming the current political crisis.

Our conference is one in a normal organizational series, but the prolonged economic crisis and especially the tense political situation that is seriously jeopardizing democracy, pluralism, and normal political life in the country give it the dimensions and importance of an extraordinary conference.

One can see everywhere the tangible consequences of such a situation, in an unbridled and unprecedented war of words, in the persecution of political opponents, in political murders like that of Gjovalin Cekini in Shkoder on 14 January, down to the arrest and illegal and anticonstitutional detention in prison for political motives of the deputy Fatos Nano, our party's chairman.

It is nevertheless to the credit and honor of the Socialist Party [PSSh] that, as a party whose symbol is a rose, it has been able to preserve a cool head and maintain its political balance, presenting itself at home and abroad as a mature political force, responsible for the nation's destiny, and with wide popular support. With a highly developed sense of dedication and tangible commitment to the progress of democracy in Albania, even though in opposition, it has continually sent out a message of understanding, tolerance and democratic cooperation. Here at our Second National Conference is a political force with credibility for the future.

Our party now spreads throughout the country and includes, not just notionally but in reality, more than 100,000 members grouped in 3,720 party organizations. In 1993 alone, more than 3,000 new members were admitted to its ranks. The massive Eurosocialist Youth Forum and the Socialist Women's Forum, which give a truly democratic spirit to the PSSh's structures, are evidence of the party's present and future strength. The admission of our Eurosocialist Youth Forum as an

observer at the Socialist Youth International is a deserved sign of appreciation and a joy for us all, for which we send our warm congratulations from the platform of this conference!

We are nevertheless aware that successfully confronting the challenges of the times will in the future demand increasing attention to the party's standards and its work, calling for a party that will accompany diversity of opinion, a vigorous democratic life within its ranks, and a courageous commitment in all its structures with exemplary discipline and organization, very different from the models of centralist parties with a rigorous class character. We are determined to build on what we have achieved, in order always to have a party that is responsible for its duties and up to its well known option of democratic socialism.

A New Political Settlement—A Demand of the Times

The political life of our country is marked by phenomena and contradictions that indicate an increasing restriction of the scope of democracy. The political struggle is being waged with great intensity, savagery, and a marked lack of dialogue and consensus, fraught with severe historical and contemporary prejudices. The Democratic Party [PD] is using a new class struggle as its main instrument for maintaining power. The PD strikes at diversity of opinion, the opposition, views that oppose or compete with those of the state, and all those who think differently accompanying all this with the outlines of a police state.

The PD is responsible for the currently tense political situation in the country. Even though, for demagogy and political rhetoric, it does not hesitate to say "good morning" to the opposition, in reality it is attempting to paralyze every kind of opposition, including even the parties with which it is formally in coalition. The marked absence of will to create the political leeway for social compromise has led it into the absurd position of rejecting every other alternative and all forms of cooperation and tolerance. It is showing the mentality and practices of a one-party state everywhere and in almost everything.

As a result, the PD can no longer conceal its failure as a political force that equated itself with democracy or hide its inability to correct itself and its lack of confidence, ideas, and solutions. Chill disillusionment and a mass flight from its ranks have become a growing protest against the many illusions that its spread with its promises and its programs.

In an attempt to cope with its identity crisis, it is merely pursuing paths that deepen it further. Authoritarian centralism of power, a strengthening of the executive at the expense of parliament, the blockade of local government, and the creation of intermediary links in the shape of directorates appointed by and dependent on the central authorities are among the main signs of the crisis of the PD's government, as are the violations of democracy and the abuses of the people's free votes. The corruption of the members of government lifts them above the poverty of ordinary people, and cannot fail to be at the latter's expense. The PD's rule is now in political and institutional crisis, and it cannot emerge from this with the help of piecemeal repairs and patches, as the president is attempting to do with his aim of rescuing the PD's "top political command."

The open subjugation of the judiciary to the executive and the party-state is another highly dangerous and very disturbing phenomenon in our society today. The forced approval through the use of majority voting cards of some antidemocratic laws such as 24-1, the Press Law, and the totalitarian-style amendments to the Penal Code add to this disquieting phenomenon.

The violation of human rights and freedoms has become the most dangerous and disturbing phenomenon for our society. The mass dismissal of PSSh members and sympathizers from organs of the state and other institutions, even academic institutions, through the use of the antidemocratic 24-1 law, mass unemployment, court proceedings against journalists including members of the PSSh's forums, physical violence against some PSSh deputies, savage police terror and violence even inside police stations that has in some cases led to irreparable physical injury and even death, have become very worrying phenomena. Only in totalitarian states are counter rallies held, deputies are forbidden to meet their electorate, people are imprisoned for taking part in peaceful rallies and protests, or even just because they go to the cemeteries of the nation's martyrs, as happened on 29 November last year in Durres, Gjirokaster, and elsewhere. The radio and television have virtually closed their doors to the PSSh.

For five months now, the police throughout Albania have been rejecting on the most absurd pretexts the PSSh's applications to hold rallies in city squares. The example of Tirana, where the police have refused nine applications by the PSSh Managing Committee (on the final occasion with an unprecedented demonstration of force) clearly demonstrates the significant and worrying narrowing of the scope of democracy in our country.

The arrest and political imprisonment of Fatos Nano, PSSh chairman and People's Assembly deputy, marks the culmination of flagrant violations of human rights and freedoms. The manner in which he was accused, the time at which this charge was raised, his arrest a few days after the removal of his immunity and a few hours before the PSSh's peaceful and authorized rally, the replacement of two prosecutors in order to carry out the order for his arrest, his arrest by a newly-appointed prosecutor, his detention in prison under a harsh police regime, and the return of his file by the court because of lack of facts and evidence as a result of the investigating group's prior judgment of the case—all these things show that Fatos Nano has been arrested as an opponent of the regime and has been imprisoned for political revenge and in order to attain definite political goals, to divide and liquidate the PSSh. However, such goals can never be attained, not

today, and not tomorrow! This is our viewpoint. This is the will of the PSSh's members and supporters!

The powerful support of more then 700,000 members of the Albanian electorate who gave their signatures for the release of Fatos Nano and the broad support of well-known democratic organizations in Europe that have considered the "Nano affair" a political matter are proof to us of the justice of our stand. On this basis, we have demanded and demand from this conference too Fatos Nano's immediate release. This is a legitimate and democratic demand, and not an indicator of any "passion for creating cults!" We have never identified the party with individuals, whoever they may be. This matter has for us the value and weight of a principle!

Comrade delegates, faced with such a reality, the PSSh has played its vital and historic role for democracy as a constructive opposition, a force that expresses and defends broad social interests and an alternative that is well known in Europe. The PSSh is intensively struggling and working with legal means and democratic methods, not to bring back the old system, which failed and will never return, but to ensure the normal conduct of the transition and a changeover to a genuinely democratic society. In this sense, we as an opposition have not been the PD's "editors," but the "creators," of course not the only ones, of the Albanian political scene. Also, from the political struggle that has been waged so far, the PSSh has emerged more mature, more consolidated, and clearer in programing how its work is to be carried out. It now enjoys broad national and international support.

We have never viewed the struggle between political forces, particularly between the two main ones, the PD and the PSSh, as a struggle between opposing systems or between mutually exclusive poles, but as a competition of alternatives and concrete solutions for the difficult problems of the transition. In our view, it has never been said that competitors should necessarily be each other's enemies. The PD leaders, especially certain extremist sections in its government, cannot manage to understand this. Certain representatives of these sections, who pay only lip service to pluralism, do not even flinch from such statements as "Albania will never again allow itself to be led by the PSSh," thus further inciting divisions among the people.

On this occasion, we would like to return to the familiar principle that in a democratic country the opposition does not exist at the mercy of those in power, but is a legal and vitally important factor for the functioning of society and the defense of national interests and the basic values and principles of democracy. Whoever genuinely feels responsible for the country's fate must not behave demagogically with the opposition and must not resemble someone who "stabs you in the night and mourns you in the morning."

It is precisely these developments that disturb people, who are increasingly asking what is going on, where are we heading, how we will get over this excessively tense situation, how democracy will be defended and developed, how the crisis will be brought to an end, and whether or not the road will be opened toward stability, economic revival, employment, higher labor productivity, and the living standards without which there can be no genuine democracy.

In order to provide an answer to such reasonable questions, the PSSh today reemphasizes its political alternative. We aim thereby, first of all, to say "no" to confrontation, social tensions, the persecution of political opponents, corruption, and every other negative and antidemocratic phenomenon that threatens to become a social blight. Second, we give a powerful "yes" to a new political settlement in Albania, economic reform, democratic tolerance, pluralism, national understanding, social peace, and everything else that will assist Albania's dignified integration into a changing and developing world.

We think that the country today finds itself in a phase when the overthrow of the old, failed communist system has on a political plane come to an end, and is irreversible. It therefore follows that the strategy of political tension and confrontation that the ruling PD persists in following is not only outdated, but also extremely harmful and dangerous, because a basic orientation toward carrying out the economic reform, and all that means, guides all the Albanian political forces today.

That is why the foundation of our political alternative rests upon the conclusion that the basis of a secure and prosperous future requires the responsibility of all political forces, the compilation of an anticrisis program, and a strategy of economic and institutional reform, scientifically based and with broad social support.

In order to achieve this, to further promote the establishment of a democratic society in Albania, and to unblock the economy, it is our belief that it must be admitted that the premature political and moral exhaustion of the PD regime is a real fact, and that it has become imperative to create a new political balance and a new formula for government.

New elections! That is our demand today. That is our slogan of the day! We will struggle for these with democratic means, for the sake of democracy. Our demand for early elections at a time when the PD holds sway as an undemocratic force that admits no alternative, is neither anticonstitutional, antidemocratic, nor destabilizing, but in harmony with the dialectic of transition and the state of our institutions. We ask for elections for the sake of stabilizing the country, the defense of the country, and national affirmation.

We see that such a thing is common practice in other countries, even in countries famous for their democratic traditions. The PSSh's demand to put the political forces to the test once gain is therefore not exceptional, and is hampered by no constitutional obstacle. Article 28, Item Nine of the Main Constitutional Dispositions provides

for and permits the dissolution of parliament by the president and the announcement of early elections.

Besides, in a period of transition such as this, there are many factors that prompt such an idea or could in practice lead to early elections. First of all, there is the economic factor, the economic crisis. When electors voted for the PD on 22 March [1992] with the motto, "Let's give the PD a try," they were thinking of the PD's promises to extract the country from its deep economic crisis and to create the necessary stability to pave the way for economic development.

Of course, the PD's two-year period in power has not been enough to fully achieve such an aim. However, it is enough time for the electorate to see whether the government and its management for affairs are heading in the right direction, whether the government shows dedication, and whether it has placed able and uncorrupted people in positions of power. We must admit that people's massive disillusionment in the PD and its government is entirely well- grounded. This was evident on 26 July 1992, when local government elections were held, in which not only the majority of the electorate voted for the PSSh's candidates, but there was a significant increase in the number of people not going to the polls. Since that time, the pressure for change among the electorate has been rising, and we will not prejudge the issue by saying whether or not this is entirely to the benefit of our party.

At the same time, it must be said that the balance of forces within the PD itself has changed, with the departure from it of the group of "motionists," who formed the Democratic Alliance, and most recently, the departure of a realistic right-wing group, which is expected to form its own party. Changes have also occurred within other parties that did not achieve parliamentary representation. Such changes cannot fail to bring not only confusion, if not a situation of crisis, to the Albanian parliament, but also a significant decline in its authority and effectiveness. The Albanian parliament today does not reflect the country's political and electoral balance.

In response to these changes and this deep disproportion, and bearing in mind that the ruling party shows no readiness to cooperate with other political forces, especially of the opposition, in order to solve the many acute problems common to our society (and cooperation does not necessarily mean a government coalition), we have issued now well-known proposals:

1. Let the parliament approve as soon as possible the Albanian constitution, seeing this as a condition to guarantee the operation of all democratic institutions and mechanisms of the state and the judiciary, as well as for Albania's integration in the Council of Europe and other international organizations. We consider it necessary for the constitution to be subjected to the people's judgment and vote of confidence. Therefore, during the general elections, let the people also be given the opportunity to vote on the Albanian constitution.

2. Let a "roundtable" of parties start work in order discuss how to relieve the tension of the situation and to establish the equilibrium that has been so seriously upset. We think that the holding of early elections before this autumn would be the sole constitutional way to reach a new political settlement. For this, we propose the approval of a paraelectoral social pact that will ensure that the elections are held in a calm political situation.

The General Management Committee thought of singling out these two demands from the others, not only in order to indicate their importance, but also to give the conference the opportunity to express its view of them, and to say whether we agree to put them at the center of our action program this year. We take the view that these two demands require a total commitment from us, from all the PSSh structures, the Eurosocialist Youth Forum, and the Socialist Women's Forum, in publicizing the PSSh's achievements as a political force that knows no generation gap and has the ability to govern because it knows how to cooperate and to give the best alternative, in sounding out the electorate through frequent and lively meetings, in drawing up draft programs that will be as concrete as possible, and in selecting able candidates who enjoy the voters' support and trust, etc.

In the present situation, the General Management Committee also believes that the work of the PSSh parliamentary group claims priority, alongside cooperation with other political forces and such associations as those of the National Liberation War veterans, the war and labor invalids, the former prisoners and victims of political persecution, the Albanian Confederation of Trade Unions, and others. The PSSh again publicly declares that it respects every officially-recognized organization and association, because these are a product and necessary ingredient of democracy. It is open and ready to cooperate with them both locally and centrally. The nation and the development of the country, now as never before, require new and broad scope for cooperation and understanding among all representatives of society.

We are open to dialogue and cooperation with all political forces on the basis of the principles of equality among parties, whether great or small; of mutual trust and respect accompanied by a concern not to turn differences into obstacles to cooperation but into impulses toward finding a common language on definite issues; and of noninterference of one party in the affairs of another.

As so far, so in the future too, we will not hesitate, on the basis of these principles, to support just standpoints of the Democratic Alliance, the Social Democratic Party, the National Unity Party, the Popular Party, the Social Workers Party, the Agrarian Party, and even the PD and its government, just as we have always welcomed every standpoint of theirs that supports our alternatives, or criticizes them and presents other alternatives that are more realistic than ours. Such cooperation is to the benefit of democracy and the social peace that is so necessary, and does not constitute a kind of "anti-PD

bloc," as the PD executive chairman hastened to call it. We use this opportunity to tell the PD that, if you feel isolated, you should look for the reason in your party and government, because finding room for cooperation is the ABC of a genuine democratic society, showing the ability of a political force to govern.

Room for cooperation in a genuinely democratic society can and must be found, but this requires the will and tolerance on all sides. In particular, no political force must lack this will as far as the national cause is concerned. So far, the political parties and certain groups both "affiliated" and "nonaffiliated" have devised theories and have also organized some political activities on the subject of national conciliation and unification. The PSSh has also several times come out in favor of this splendid initiative. However, the influence of this initiative is not evident in our sociopolitical life. One can even occasionally notice the opposite.

Our option is for all the pan-Albanian political forces to talk and to agree on two essential matters: first, a single national platform, and second, a long-term plan of action to realize the national cause. The time has come to put an end to this centuries- old delay, and for the Albanian political parties, all together, to take up the banner of pan national consensus as the first step toward national unification.

The Social Market Economy—The PSSh's Priority Alternative

Almost three years ago, when the Albanian economy was at the nadir of its crisis, the PSSh's program aimed to achieve two main goals: the stabilization of the economy and its orderly and carefully-considered transition to a social market economy. However, as is well known, political developments brought the PD to the leadership of political life in Albania, and the PD represented and began implementing its economic program based on the famous theory of "shock-therapy."

We do not say that there have been no successes at all during its two years in power. We appreciate the work done to draft and approve legislation that aims to establish a market economy in our country. Another positive feature has been the creation of a new class of businessmen who are increasingly assuming importance in the economic reform. The reining in of the inflation rate, although accomplished mainly by administrative rather than effective economic methods, has been a step that should be followed by other more effective ones.

However, we think that these and a few other achievements are first of all a result of the fact that Albania has now embarked on the road of irreversible transformations, and all Albanians and all political forces have been involved in them. Second, these achievements are not such as to justify the euphoria and demagogic exaggeration of successes and the concealment of failures in which the ruling party indulges, attempting to create an atmosphere in which people become accustomed to the crisis by saying, "Albania is all right with the PD, don't ask for any more!" With regret, but with a feeling of realism, we must admit that the PD program, which is based on neoliberalism, monetarism, the myth of the free market, and on the hope to stabilize the economy fast and to solve everything with help from abroad, in other words on one sidedness and haphazardness, is not as successful in our country as it is portrayed. The medium-term program put forward by the Meksi Government shows this very clearly. "The Albanian miracle" in the implementation of "shock therapy" has now failed, as also happened in other countries of East Europe.

The measures taken by the Meksi Government to control the crisis, beyond a strenuously-applied brake on the inflation rate, have not hit their targets: Production remains in general at minimal levels, far below the level of 1989 (although it is said that its decline has been halted); unemployment has reached the colossal figure of 44.5 percent of the able-bodied population, or about 400,000 people, while living standards have fallen more than 40 percent in one year, because the prices of consumer goods have risen nine- or 10-fold, while pay has only risen two- or three-fold. The foreign debt has risen from $400 million to $625 million and is continuing to rise fast because of the very serious foreign trade deficit.

The galloping internal debt has totally asphyxiated the operations of enterprises. The market demand for goods and services is mainly ascribable to foreign-currency remittances from economic emigrees, a normal mechanism of the free market when the value of the lek falls in relation to goods on the domestic market, while it is artificially revalued in relation to foreign currencies. The state of public finances remains serious, and public finance relies solely on additions to the variety and size of taxes and on emergency interventions from the sale of state assets accumulated by the people for almost five decades. Meanwhile, the opportunities for the state and for investment credit for the expansion of production are very low. The failures to solve such vital problems as water, electricity, and fuel supplies, housing, and the health service, and the failure to guarantee minimum living conditions have become intolerable for ordinary people.

It can no longer be said that the economic crisis through which we are living is solely a result of the legacies of the past, because it is also a result of the policies pursued by the ruling PD in these two years of efforts to roughly shift us into a market economy. The incompetence of members of the government, the maladministration of foreign aid, and the lack of the hoped-for foreign investments led to the failure of such a course; the PD is therefore hastening, in the midst of this confusion, to make what "self-corrections" are possible, and even to talk about the "social economy of the market," which has now been reduced to a "welfare economy" without prospects.

Being much more realistically aware of the critical state of the economy than the party in power, the PSSh declares that it considers the reforms irreversible, but

that it is necessary, as they are carried out, to make the necessary corrections. The PSSh is also a political force that is able to draw up and to present to the country its own alternative that ensures more successful solutions to the current and forthcoming problems of the economic reform.

The two fundamental axes of the PSSh's economic program remain the control of the economic and social crisis and the structural transformation of the economy in order to establish a social market economy.

Of course, the social market economy is neither an "abstract notion" nor a "play on words." The concept of the social market economy is much deeper than that which leaders of our right-wing leaders occasionally sneer at, as they attempt out of demagogy and political opportunism to equate it with some funds for social welfare which, in our country's case, would not suffice even to keep alive for six to 12 months our country's hundreds of thousands of unemployed. Nor is a social market economy made by adding a few public holidays, which are given to us by history or by God! Still less can it be achieved by the five-day week at a time when production and productivity are at very low levels.

The social market economy is now a theoretical and practical alternative that is mostly supported and implemented by political forces of a social-democratic tendency, which understand by the term a correction of capitalism in order to make it a humane society in which it becomes possible to achieve a genuine political democracy and an genuine economic democracy, a society that gives individuals equal opportunities and in which freedom of the citizen coexists with social responsibility, and a remuneration of ability with social solidarity and a struggle against poverty under the state's supervision. The social market economy is an economic model based on private property, whose sanctity we will defend with the law, and on free initiative and competition, but which does not exclude a variety of forms of ownership, the public sector, and other forms of ownership administered according to the principles of the market economy.

Relying on such an understanding of the social market economy, we Socialists place at the foundation of our economic alternative the idea of the new role of the democratic state, which obliquely intervenes in the economy with the aim of giving the market social and humane dimensions and guaranteeing the predominance of private property by creating total scope for the competition of all kinds of ownership. We are for a society that will be based on the logic of profit but at the same time on a logic of social solidarity, on a dynamic combination of the self-regulating mechanisms of the market and factors that balance the market's shortcomings.

In our economic alternative, the state will be required to devise the theoretical instruments for an anti-crisis reform program, but it will in particular determine measures for their practical implementation in two interrelated phases:

In the first phase, in accordance with the mechanism of the market economy, by giving continual regulatory nudges, while strategically, in the second phase, when the economy has assumed its normal form and will be close to using its potential, it will move to self-regulation.

The concept of property also lies at the basis of our economic alternative, with concrete programs to transform, restructure, and develop it, in order to lay the foundations of a mixed economy in which private and public property will coexist, confronting the competition of the market.

Privatization is for us too a basic component of the economic reform and a cardinal precondition for the creation of a market economy. However, the PSSh does not see it as a goal in itself or as the sole road. We are not for "total privatization," as it is normally put, but for the fastest possible privatization, while aiming at the decentralization of some enterprises, transforming them entirely and making them public, independent, and productive both nationally and locally, so that "a state of the best kind" may act in the economic field as a normal shareholder and a market agent, and so that there will be respect for the coexistence of the private sector and the public sector, which will gradually be wound down in favor of the private.

Our strategy in this direction remains the use of such methods as will be able to ensure, not the destruction and looting of property, as is happening, but a managerial transformation and a considered privatization that will guarantee the restructuring and revival of the economy. Our motto in this direction is, "Not change and privatization in order to simply change the owner, but in order to secure more production and more employment."

The PSSh considers to be illegal the privatization of more than 500 small and medium-sized state enterprises by government decrees, or by local privatization boards, without action and openly in the favor of certain individuals and groups. It promises to review the mistakes committed in the course of this process, and to redress all injustices with the help of modern legislation.

The PSSh has relied for its privatization program as a whole on the best European experience. This program also anticipates the privatization of large state enterprises, aiming at making property owners out of the largest number of citizens.

The PSSh favors privatization on the basis of vouchers assessed on the basis of the contribution, direct or indirect, of everybody who has labored and sweated to create this wealth during the last five decades. Bearing this in mind, we say that only the parliament elected by the people must legally decide on the distribution of this wealth, in order to avoid injustices and social tensions,

whether old or new. This will mean that the correction of the injustices of the past will not lead to new injustices and social tensions. We do not see privatization as a return to the economy of 1938, but as a premise for putting ourselves on the lines of an up- to-date European economy.

The PSSh has come out against the PD's idea of privatizing everything. We think that the most sensitive sectors such as hydroelectric stations, mining, oil, the railroads, telecommunications, military industries, urban utilities, etc., should remain in public ownership. This stems from the idea of the new role of the democratic state in the social market economy and the need for a variety of forms of ownership, with the natural aim of creating total scope for competition and free initiative.

In short, the PSSh's economic alternative will, in changing the course of the economic reform, aim to simultaneously achieve three main objectives:

a) The maximal and effective mobilization of all our resources and assets, seeing this as the core of an anticrisis program.

b) Continuing to restructure the economy in order to adapt it as fast as possible to the demands of the market.

c) Guaranteeing the activities and high and stable profits of domestic and foreign capital.

Such changes in the course of the economic reform, seen both macro- and microeconomically, will be accompanied by the drafting and implementation of a range of concrete policies and solutions.

Thus, the PSSh does not view restraining inflation as an end in itself or in isolation from such social problems as high unemployment. We are for the optimal balance between these two indicators, and for a level of inflation that will reduce unemployment to 10-15 percent, i.e. slightly more than in other European countries. Our country's academics and economists are able to draft and implement programs for the maximal and effective mobilization of all our resources, deepening the restructuring of our economy for its fastest possible adaptation to the demands of the world market, guaranteeing high and stable profits for foreign capital alongside a higher spirit of cooperation and partnership, unfreezing economic emigration.

Particular attention must be devoted to the effective reactivization of some sectors of industry such as mines, mineral processing, engineering, light industry, the food industry, tourism, etc., in which it is anticipated that large numbers of people both in the towns and the countryside will find work.

In these directions, the PSSh is planning national, regional, and local programs to create new jobs, bearing particularly in mind the areas most affected by unemployment and a legacy of poverty.

It is well known that the liberalization of prices and their free determination by the market on the basis of supply and demand have significantly increased the cost of living, because the government has not allowed pay to follow the movement of prices. The PSSh favors an elastic policy in this, and believes that the free determination of prices should be followed by the necessary adjustments in the system of wages, pensions, social welfare, etc.

Our economy is not prepared to cope with the normal operation of the prices and wages mechanism, which is at present influenced by foreign production factors, earnings from emigration, international prices, customs tariffs, and currency exchange rates. Under these conditions, the state must now and again intervene in order to avoid possible speculative and undeserved profits. It is also necessary to maintain state guaranteed prices for the procurement of agricultural and dairy products, with the aim of encouraging the development of the products and byproducts the market demands.

As for pay, we favor a better appreciation of intellectual labor; reasonable differentials, in accordance with the economic situation, between high and low pay; a minimum wage calculated on the basis of a minimum subsistence; and wage freedom in the private sector, all to be regulated by laws approved in parliament.

The PSSh favors a credit, fiscal, and customs policy that will aim to stimulate and do what is possible to protect the domestic market for agricultural and industrial production, whether of traditional kinds or those "in their infancy." It also favors expanding the private sector and employing tens and hundreds of thousands of people in towns and centers of employment.

Fiscal policy must be regulated in two main directions: first, in order to stimulate and protect the development of domestic production and the equilibrium of the market and supply and demand. This would be helped by the establishment of a progressive taxation system and the replacement of turnover tax by a value-added tax. The second direction involves tightening the taxation administration in order to administrate revenue in the best possible way through improved financial control, and a struggle against corruption and improper profits that damage the interests of the state and of working people. A policy of reducing the budget deficit must take more care to distribute the burden better between the productive and the retail and service sectors. As part of a social market economy, we will reform the banking system, a financial institution with an irreplaceable role, by using the instruments of money, credit, and the financial market (in money and securities), in order to stabilize and further develop the range of production and to develop international economic relations and investments.

The establishment of local government on a stable and independent economic basis is a basic problem for us Socialists. We think that this is not simply a question of

a skeletal law or a "local" budget that depends almost entirely on the government and the ministries, but an issue that demands a total regulation of the prerogatives of popular self-government and the assets and financial resources of these authorities, which will, on one hand, oblige and encourage these authorities to manage their productive activities and their natural resources, and also to confront and solve the many key problems of public services in the towns and the countryside.

A special policy will be devised favoring the countryside, especially the poor mountain regions. This will be supported by a range of concessionary policies for prices, loans, agricultural machinery, and nitrate fertilizers, and by devising and introducing at the proper time a customs and taxation system that will not only cover the fiscal aspect, as happened with the decree of the Meksi Government. We aim "to give oxygen" to Albanian agricultural and livestock production, or those products and trades for which every opportunity exists and where we do not lack a tradition. The PSSh opposes introducing taxes for the peasantry in 1994.

This conclusion is based on the current situation of agriculture and the countryside in general, which is in reality quite different from what those in power claim. The state of the countryside is serious. Land distribution has stuck at 70 percent, while official spokesmen claim that it has reached 95 percent. The countryside and agricultural production cannot set off on the right road without title deeds being distributed.

Albanian agriculture is still not in a position to secure bread and other products for the rural population, let alone the towns. The irrigation network has been to a large extent destroyed, the seed distribution system does not work, and the production of chemical fertilizer has sunk to the levels of several decades ago. The overwhelming majority of private peasants, especially those a long way from the towns, do not have any opportunity to send their produce to market. At the same time, peasants are obliged to buy industrial goods at European prices.

Our policy for the development of sheep-farming also aims at alleviating these areas today. Millions of dollars are today leaving Albania in order to import agricultural and dairy products that we used to export until yesterday, and can be produced at home; meanwhile, no ways are being found, no financially considered economic ways and means, to invest these millions in Albania, in agriculture, tourism, and other sectors.

We want to correct the anticonstitutional and illegal steps that were taken to destroy the agricultural enterprises. The parliament must issue a comprehensive law to cover these major assets of 200,000 hectares, which used to account for 25 percent of the country's agricultural production.

It is clear to everybody that Albanian agriculture cannot progress and achieve European levels divided into about 500,000 individual plots; we therefore, in time, support the idea of the modern organization of private agricultural production.

We think that the future of democracy and the market economy in Albania depends on the abilities the political forces will show in devising and developing a social infrastructure and up-to-date systems of education, health, culture, social security, consumer protection, etc., things we regretfully note have been neglected or destroyed. The PSSh has devoted more attention than any other political force to human concerns and to the social dimension of the market economy, on the basis of the fact that we are faced with a marked deterioration of the social position of increasingly broad strata of our society; that 20 percent of urban families, or one in five, are totally destitute and receive no income other than what they receive as welfare; and that services in health, education, culture, etc., are less and less well covered.

We think that the economic reform can only be crowned with success if we show ourselves sensitive to human concerns, or, in other words, to the social costs of the reform. This is the reason that has impelled us not to rest content with compiling the most up- to-date social program possible, but to insist on realizing it on the basis of the new political settlement that we propose.

For example, the PSSh's alternative in the field of education lays down the goal of reforming and modernizing the educational system at all levels, in content and in structure, and completing the relevant legislation to make education open, democratic, secular, and modern. The broad basis of the education of Albanian citizens will continue to be in state schools. In this context, the educational rights of the minorities will be respected. Education will be paid for and conducted by the state. Private education will be permitted by law and its curricula will be subject to state standards. This will also be true of foreign schools. The criterion for employment and for promotion to supervisory responsibility at all levels of the schools will be professional ability. The status of a teacher and lecturer, of a school pupil and college student, and the duties of a parent in his relationship with the school, will be covered by a PSSh legislative initiative. Cooperation in European projects and the twinning of our schools and universities with those in foreign countries will remain an important resource in the future too.

In its program for health, the PSSh will rely on the principle that every citizen will receive the health care he requires, regardless of his social position or economic level.

Faced with the economic condition of a state that cannot promise adequate budget resources for health, the idea of health insurance, dependent on income, will be gradually introduced, as the only way to achieve a modern medical service, the best possible pay for health personnel, and also the basic preconditions for a struggle against corruption in the health sector. The aim will be to improve all

three levels of the health service, and to devote particular attention to the modernization of preventive medicine and the emergency service.

By means of the social security system, we aim to offer protection against the perils of age, illness, accidents, invalidity, unemployment, and at the same time the poverty in which certain strata of society will continue to find themselves. The social security system at which we aim combines personal responsibility and social solidarity. Its structure will be subdivided into insurance, solidarity funds, aid, etc., and also for different ages and professions. We will care for war veterans according to the same standards other European countries adopt toward those who contributed to the struggle against fascism.

At a time when cultural and academic contacts with other countries are increasing, our state and society have the duty to maintain and support our national cultural identity. We therefore favor support for the dignified revival of central institutions of pan-national importance such as the Academy of Sciences, the National Theater, the Opera and Ballet Theater, Albanfilm, the Naim Frasheri Publishing House, the central museums, etc. This will be supplemented by cooperation between the central institutions and social organizations, by agreements with international organizations and associations, and also by demanding a certain quota from private enterprises.

In this same area, the PSSh alternative provides for certain specific measures for the intelligentsia, for the operation of existing academic institutions and their increased cooperation with individual European bodies and projects, the maintenance of high university numbers, legislative and economic incentives for the private sector to invest in academic institutions, improved pay and welfare for intellectuals with high levels of postgraduate qualifications, and the legal protection of authors' copyright within Albania and abroad, etc.

In conclusion, the PSSh declares that its alternative gives optimal solutions to the problems that have accumulated during our country's economic crisis, and that it is able to confront the challenges of the times in this difficult transition period. Nevertheless, it defends the view that the country requires medium- term and long-term macroeconomic guidelines that cannot be included within the framework of the program of an individual government of whatever party. These guidelines require a broad consensus and we will be unsparing in our commitment and efforts to achieve this.

For an Active and Realistic Foreign Policy

The PSSh has assembled a broad and realistic vision regarding both foreign policy and the influence of foreign factors on the successful realization of the reforms in Albania. It has clearly expressed its stands in its program documents and in its daily work. Therefore, without pretending to give a total overview of foreign policy, we would wish merely to stress certain objections and priorities.

We value the steps that have been taken to overcome Albania's foreign isolation and support the development of the process of international relations as well as efforts to establish a new order of peace and stability that will exclude all kinds of political, national, economic, ethnic, or religious conflict among countries and peoples, especially in our tense region.

The PSSh once again takes the opportunity to express gratitude to the countries and states of Europe, the United States, China, and the countries of the Islamic community for the help they have given to our country in this difficult period of transition. We appreciate the continually active roles of the EU, the Western European Union, and more broadly, that of the CSCE, not only in the process of economic renewal, but also politically and in support of our national cause.

We hold fast to the view that new geopolitical realities have brought regional factors to the fore. Our foreign policy in this field should therefore be marked by dynamic equilibrium. We view regional factors as extensions of nonregional factors of European and Atlantic security. We cannot respond to this situation with the haphazard and amateur enthusiasm of much of our foreign policy, over which we have already expressed our objections. The priorities given to chance opportunities have detracted from the work of Albanian diplomacy, and brought a kind of chill in relations with Europe, a chill that cannot be hidden by spectacular scenes at airports and numbers of handshakes.

Relations with neighboring countries also constitute a priority that can never be neglected, and we must therefore continually be making efforts to ensure we are always friends with these countries, bringing problems out into the open and solving them, but above all not allowing the creation of new problems that cool relations.

The political conditions in the region are not those of four or five years ago. The war, the unprecedented violence of the Serbian chauvinists in Bosnia and other areas of the former Yugoslavia, and the grim terror against the Albanians in Kosova include ingredients that could lead to this war spreading. This would be fatal to the peoples of the Balkans. We therefore support every effort, within our beyond the Balkans, to avert this.

In this tense situation in the region, the PSSh repeats its stand in support of our brothers in Kosova, in their own territories in the former Yugoslavia, and in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. We clearly hold fast to the idea that respect for the principle of that borders cannot be changed by force does not conflict with the recognition of the rights of people to self-determination. The PSSh thinks that there is an urgent need today to find new ways for the peoples of the Balkans to live

together in peace and to work for prosperity and democracy, not allowing antagonisms to be created among them through the exploitation of differences in economic levels, or national, religious, linguistic, and cultural differences, etc. We think that an independent Kosova free from Serbian occupation would not only realize aspirations of the people of Kosova and be an important step toward solving our national question, but would also be a factor of peace and stability in the region.

Despite the serious conditions now prevailing in the Balkans, the PSSh repeats its familiar stand that Albanian diplomacy should take realistic and tangible steps with clear initiatives to reactivate bilateral and multilateral Balkan cooperation in political, economic, and cultural fields, in technical and academic cooperation, etc. The PSSh powerfully supports and will devote all its energies to encouraging dialogue, mutual understanding, and cooperation among the peoples of the region, in the belief that interdependency and peaceful coexistence constitute a contemporary framework for guaranteeing national independence and identity. The problems of the Balkans must be solved first of all by the peoples of the Balkan themselves, but must of course be viewed in close connection with European and world problems. Among other things, we favor acting on the initiative for all the progressive left-wing forces in the Balkans to sit down together "round one table."

At the same time, the PSSh declares itself against the creation of miniature alliances and the spirit of speculation and distrust that these create. Good bilateral relations should pave the way for the establishment of broad, multilateral cooperation in the region.

In this context, the PSSh long ago expressed its stand that relations with such neighboring countries as Greece and Italy must take priority in the region. We have always considered these countries as natural gateways for Albania's integration in Europe. However, unfortunately, a kind of undesirable chill has arisen in our relations with them. Diplomatic efforts in this field have been haphazard and dilettante.

We therefore wish that the Albanian state would undertake a clear strategy in relation to our neighbor Greece, especially now that there is a Socialist government there and we are familiar with the predisposition and readiness of Pasok [Panhellenic Socialist Movement] to normalize relations, to achieve cooperation and good-neighborliness, and to legalize Albanian emigrants working in Greece. We support the readiness of Greek diplomacy to view more realistically both the concept of Europe and the Cam problem.

We have been and will remain committed in our efforts and stands on respecting and defending all the rights of the Greek minority in Albania, recognized by the CSCE documents.

The PSSh appreciates Greece's assumption in her turn of the EU chairmanship, and believes that she will play a significant role in Albania's integration in civilized Europe. The Albanian state, too, must be more active in this.

The Albanian people are grateful to friendly Italy for the help that it has given and for its generosity in welcoming thousands of young Albanian men and women. However, we cannot agree with the Albanian Government's hasty and unargued standpoints toward Italy, which recently, in the absence of efforts to find a common language, have led to a cooling relations between our two countries, something that is unacceptable for the friendly feelings the Albanian people cherish for the Italian people.

We appreciate the need to strengthen relations with Turkey, for these are traditional relations with a friendly people that supported Albania with their own generous help at the start of democratic processes in the country. We similarly appreciate the need to make more tangible relations with Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, and Slovenia, as Balkan countries.

We have desired and still desire good relations with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, not only because we wish to see this country a factor of peace and stability in the region, but also because more than 800,000 Albanians live there. However, we have noticed some attitudes on the part of the Macedonian state that are not in the least realistic toward the fair demands of the Albanian population to enjoy the same rights and freedoms enjoyed by citizens of other nationalities. We cannot in any way agree with the statements of the highest officials of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, rejecting the Albanians as a state-forming element. In this direction, the PSSh has criticized the tolerant and often irresponsible attitudes of the Albanian Government, which has both been in a hurry when there was no need, and has kept silent when it should not have done.

We do not consider Albania's opening to the world to be complete solely with stable and friendly relations with the Balkan countries, Germany, France, Britain, the Scandinavian countries, etc., and with the United States, but also with Japan, China, Canada, the Russian Federation, the Arab countries, etc. The government's occasional welcome steps in this direction have either been inconsiderable or spectacular, without any clear strategy, and without vigor.

We do not see Albania's inclination toward Europe as the sole direction of our foreign policy. In this context, we Socialists have always appreciated relations with the United States. We have valued the standards of U.S. democracy and U.S. technical and professional assistance, which we would like to see grow and expand.

We repeat the belief that any role and any step in foreign policy is acceptable as long as it develops the concept of the independence, sovereignty, integrity, and freedom of the homeland, under conditions of interdependency. We favor the dignified integration of Albania in Europe and

in all its political, economic, and military organisms. In this sense, we value and appreciate cooperation with NATO, especially within the framework of the Partnership for Peace initiated by U.S. President Clinton.

We see this as an important step toward more solid forms of integration in European processes and Euro-Atlantic security, which will also lead to commitments for our country to respect the principles of democracy and human rights and freedoms, an area in which we are still far from familiar international standards.

The PSSh thinks that to express a wish at a verbal level, as did the parliament, is not enough to join Partnership for Peace at the highest levels, because deserving and acquiring partnership with NATO will, as we know, require proposals, measures, and tangible commitments to be studied, coordinated, and supported by legislation. For these, in our view, the parliament must neither be left to one side or presented with a "fait accompli," making what it has to say a mere formality, as happens.

Comrades delegates, the PSSH is a force of the European left, committed to recognizing the traditions and characteristics of European social democracy, which has now created its own social- democratic profile. Its prestige is continually rising among the circle of the socialist and social-democratic parties of Europe. Since the party's First Congress in June 1992, it has not only consolidated its relations with its sister parties, but has further expanded them with the Spanish Socialist Party, the Democratic Party of the Left in Italy, and the social-democratic parties of the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, etc. Positive steps have also been taken in relations with the German Social Democratic Party. It is our task to promoted and consolidate these.

We appreciate the interest being shown and the help recently given to our party by the Socialist International Committee for Central and East Europe as an important step toward the PSSh's gradual integration in the Socialist International. While this is one of our objectives for the future, we repeat that we have never acted with the idea of affirming ourselves first abroad and then in Albania. We therefore see our integration in the Socialist International first of all as an ongoing duty toward democracy in Albania.

The new political, economic, and social settlement that we propose is the most tangible expression of this commitment to the democracy, social peace, and economic reform that Albania needs so badly. We are aware of the responsibilities and sacrifices required from us, and we therefore declare once again from the platform of this conference our readiness and dedication, and that of all the PSSh's many members and supporters.

Long live the PSSh! Long live the Albanian people!

Danes To Help Rebuild Health Care System

94P20358Z Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 20 Jan 94 p 9

[Article by Birger Hilstrom: "Massive Support for Albania"]

[Excerpts] Large Danish contributions are on the way for rebuilding Albania's health-care system and amount to the most extensive export ever of a Danish overall system. Foreign Aid Minister Helle Degn has a pool of 45 million kroner [6 million dollars] ready and is calling a meeting to decide on distribution of the funds. [passage omitted]

The 45 million kroner will be provided to the Albanians over the next three years, and Degn will invite Danish foreign aid organizations and a Danish consulting group, with EU [European Union] Parliament member Freddy Blak (Social Democrat) as chairman, to a meeting on 31 January to decide how the funds are to be distributed.

"Until now we have only granted humanitarian aid of between 2 and 4 million kroner, but the effort needs to be coordinated and targeted correctly," said Degn. "I think we must support the weakest, and this means orphaned children and the handicapped, and to set up an Albanian legal system."

The Albanian Government on Sunday [16 January], asked for Danish help in drawing up a comprehensive plan for taking care of the mentally handicapped of that poor country. A comprehensive plan for psychiatric and mental retardation care will be the largest Danish system export ever, amounting to hundreds of million [kroner], and the plan will include decentralizing from Tirana, training of Albanian personnel, and establishing of new housing through [the private] ASF Danish Folkehjaelp.

The Danish consulting group, which received a request for help from the Albanian Ministry of Health following an inspection of badly deteriorating hospitals, is gathering funds for the project from, among other sources, already appropriated EU loans.

"We have broad experience in the decentralizing of institutions for the develpmentally impaired, and the Albanians wanted our model," said former Director of Social Services Alfred Dam, who has just returned home from Albania and is in the process of drafting a report on the shocking conditions in Albanian institutions.

Zhelev Dismisses Danger of 'Recommunization'

AU1802194194 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 18 Feb 94

[Text] President Zhelyu Zhelev stated as follows in an interview for the Sofia Khorizont Radio Network today:

No basic reforms have been accomplished in Bulgaria as yet, hence it is superficial to talk about recommunization as long as we have not restored private property and the land to their original owners, as long as we have not achieved a certain stage in privatization, and as long as the restitution has not been completed. The term recommunization has a meaning only if applied to the return of cadres from the old nomenklatura to the organs of state power, he pointed out.

The opposition is not behaving properly, according to President Zhelev. It could have overcome bitterness and mutual insults by restoring the old majority of the people who won the last elections and who should once more take over the executive power in order to promote the reforms. Elections under the current circumstances are likely to involve the risk of uncertain results, the president stressed.

President Zhelev sees the Union of Democratic Forces as a democratic coalition rallying the democratic, antitotalitarian, and non-communist forces, namely all those who are really called upon to carry out the reforms in Bulgaria.

This is what determines the future and fate of our country, President Zhelev stated at the end of his interview for the Khorizont Radio Network.

DUMA: U.S. Diplomats 'Forming Turkish Axis'

AU1802171694 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 14 Feb 94 p 1

[Report by Radka Petrova: "U.S. Diplomats Are Forming Turkish Axis Between Us and Greece"]

[Text] The visit by two U.S. diplomats to Kurdzhali and Krumovgrad last week, which was represented to the media and the public as a routine visit, was in fact connected with fulfilling a strategic task of drawing the Turks of the eastern Rhodopes closer to the Muslim community in northern Greece, excellently informed sources claim. An independent Greek source adds that he noticed unusual activity by Greek special services in the Greek provinces of Thrace and Rhodopes precisely at the time of the diplomatic visit to the eastern Rhodopes by Thomas Price, deputy chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy in Sofia, and Second Secretary John Kunstadter.

As is well-known, Greece has good reasons for its fears regarding the attempts to draw together the Muslims on both sides of the Bulgarian-Greek border. According to circles close to the Greek cabinet, this is the main reason for their unwillingness to open up the Makaza border crossing point.

According to experts, the U.S. position concerning drawing together the two Muslim lobbies on either side of the border aims to hold Greece in check because of its stubborn stance regarding Macedonia. This supposedly is to be achieved by insinuating that in the eastern Rhodopes and Thrace only a spark is needed to ignite a new Bosnia. When asked if they were checking on the existence of such a possibility during their visit to Kurdzhali, diplomats John Kunstadter and Thomas Price denied such an insinuation with amazement. However, according to someone who took part in the closed talks with the DPS [Movement for Rights and Freedoms], this was precisely the problem that worried the emissaries of Ambassador Montgomery. Serious observers of this problem are firm in their view that there is no doubt that the Americans are mediating in trying to bring together the two Muslim lobbies of the eastern Rhodopes and western Thrace. The number of illegal visits by two Greek parliamentary deputies, the Muslims Ahmed Saduk and Ahmed Faikoglu, to the former Kurdzhali Okrug during the last election campaign in Bulgaria allegedly formed only part of the plan that had been hatched up by strategists in Washington to draw the two Muslim communities together. Ahmed Saduk is known to have claimed that the Muslims in northern Greece are Turks. According to Greek sources, in northern Greece the Muslims number between 100,000 and 120,000. Ankara considers that about 300,000 Muslims inhabit this region. Greek lawyers recall that, before he became a member of the previous Greek Parliament, an investigation was mounted against Ahmed Saduk on suspicion of fomenting nationalist enmity.

According to sources close to the U.S. Embassy, certain diplomats are supposed to have quite seriously discussed the possibility of the DPS becoming a model for the Muslims of northern Greece. The Muslims there were recognized as a community by the 1923 Lausanne Conference, but do not possess anything like the rights now enjoyed by the Turks in Bulgaria. This is a very difficult task, because the Greek Constitution forbids the existence of ethnic parties, and in Greece it is impossible even for Slavonic-speaking Greek citizens to form a party. According to REUTER, infuriated Greeks were reported to have hurled stones at a Turkish parliamentary delegation in Xanthe in early February. It is alleged that the Turkish deputies also held talks with the Muslim community in the town about them forging closer links with their brothers in the neighboring countries.

Sources in northern Greece claim that U.S. radars are still controlling the airspace there, and they point to such equipment mounted in Maria and other nearby villages. Furthermore, it is known that all the financial aid for the mosques in the eastern Rhodopes and western Thrace, declared to consist of donations from Islamic organizations, really comes from U.S. banks.

Advantages of Partnership for Peace Examined

AU2202160094 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 17 Feb 94 p 10

[Commentary by Viktor Valentinov: "Our Politicians Forget the Difference Between NATO Partners and NATO Members"]

[Text] Bulgaria was the eighth country to sign the Partnership for Peace [PFP] Program, after Romania, Poland,, and the Ukraine, but before the Czech Republic and Albania. People at NATO headquarters praised our enthusiasm, but did not promise that we would soon become full members.

At the same time people in the West are more and more frequently launching the thesis that NATO's expansion to the East is likely to obliterate the organization's image. It would become a confederation rallying too many different interests, which would make it similar to the fable of the eagle, the crab, and the fish, each of which was trying to pull in a different direction.

Bulgaria actually consented to partnership after Moscow and Washington declared that NATO should gradually expand. Our politicians, however, do not seem prepared to imagine what our role within NATO is likely to be, while the signature under the program, which has no definite form for the time being, might also have some surprise in store. Clinton's proposal has not yet been discussed by Congress, which might propose some corrections to the president's views. Everything shows that even people in the White House have no clear idea about what NATO partnership should actually mean.

The number two at the State Department, Talbott, recently said that the PFP should develop as a buffer between Russia and Western Europe in the event Moscow becomes aggressive. Others among Clinton's advisers see it as a step toward a collective security system, without heeding Yeltsin's warning that former Warsaw Pact members should not be admitted to NATO.

Our statesmen do not seem to be concerned about the lack of clarity regarding partnership with NATO. They seem not to realize that President Zhelev's signature under the program is only the first, but not the last step toward our future association with NATO. After the brilliant expose on the reasons for our future association with NATO which was submitted in Brussels and made an excellent impression, it is high time to say how we imagine the future.

The Poles, for example, declared that they do not intend to pay for the implementation of the initiative. This question did not seem to concern us Bulgarians. Our politicians claim that the rearmament of our troops according to NATO standards, would not disastrously affect our military budget, but no arguments and figures were submitted in this respect.

Bulgarian politicians reached some kind of consensus as regards the necessity of accepting NATO's partnership offer, but should they not have reflected on our country's future strategy within the organization?

A wait-and-see policy might have achieved some success in the past, but it can hardly guarantee a place in the sun for us. The other four countries from Central Europe are treated with greater benevolence. They are eager to join NATO as full members without standing in line for the PFP. It is not very likely that people in Brussels are going to like them less, because they only half-heatedly supported the idea, and demonstratively sent lower-level delegations to sign the document.

According to NATO, the PFP signatory countries should decide for themselves to what extent they wish to be associated with NATO. Bulgaria has not responded to this remark, so far. Our politicians do not even mention the fact.

If we would like to have our share of the pie, would it not be better to declare our intentions unmistakably, rather than waiting for the others to assign us our place?

This is so, because in spite of Brussels' vehement protestations in denying the existence of two speeds in progress toward NATO—one for the Visegrad four, and the other for the remaining countries—we should not forget that war is being waged in our neighborhood and that precisely the guarantee for our national security was our "leitmotif" in opting for NATO partnership.

Commentary Urges Caution Toward Greek Embargo

AU2202100594 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 19-20 Feb 94 p 6

[Plamen Kulinski commentary: "Beware the Fire"]

[Text] Despite the sharp criticism of Athens' decision to close the port of Thessaloniki for goods from and for Greece, the Greek Government decided to sharpen its punitive measures. Furthermore, Greece has even threatened that it will prevent other neighboring states from helping the former Yugoslav republic. Indeed, Athens even wanted Bulgaria to join its punitive measures.

Greece's desire to force Skopje to accept its conditions is understandable. One can also understand the Papandreou government's efforts to please radical nationalists, who accuse him of feebleness toward the former Yugoslav republic. However, why should other states that have good relations with Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] be involved in all this? The answer might be that the end justifies the means. Greece, however, seems to forget that one means of resolving problems is dialogue. Nevertheless, it appears that the dialogue will not be resumed soon, because Skopje has made resuming the dialogue with Greece conditional on the lifting of the embargo.

Until then, as was the case with last year's blockade of the oil barges in Thessaloniki, Sofia will try to alleviate Macedonia's economic problems. Sofia will do this regardless of Athens' displeasure. After all, Greece still cannot forgive Bulgaria for being the first state to recognize Macedonia's independence. Naturally, Greece has the right to try to incorporate Bulgaria in its plans. On the other hand, Sofia also has the right to refuse to participate in those plans. Having been burned by fire in past because of other people's sins, however, Sofia should beware the new fire.

FRY Stance on Recognizing FYROM Viewed

AU2202100294 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 17 Feb 94 p 6

[Commentary by KONTINENT Belgrade correspondent Momchilo Stoyanovich: "Why Has Yugoslavia Not Yet Recognized Macedonia?"]

[Text] With the U.S. recognition of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and Russia's decision to send its ambassador to Skopje in early March, in practice all the leading countries in the world have confirmed the status of the Macedonian state. Before the beginning of 1994, Macedonia was recognized by Germany, France, Britain, and other European states, which hastened to take this step before Greece assumed the EU presidency.

The Foreign Ministry in Skopje reports that so far 27 states have established diplomatic relations with Macedonia, although the documents and communications materials of only 11 states officially refer to "the Republic of Macedonia." The remainder, including the United States, use the term "The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia," under which the United Nations admitted Macedonia as a member.

Bearing in mind that, except for Greece, Macedonia has been recognized by all the Balkan states (including all the other former Yugoslav republics,) the question why the FRY has still not recognized Macedonia remains open. Little is said openly about this issue, but the fact remains that to date no meeting has taken place between a Macedonian and a Serb at which the southern neighbor has failed to ask his northern brother the reason for his continued delay in recognizing Macedonia's independence.

Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, the man with most influence in Yugoslav politics, has not omitted to say at his meetings with Macedonian representatives that Serbia has no claims against its southern neighbor and that nothing prevents Belgrade from recognizing Macedonia, and yet in practice this does not happen.

It is natural for Yugoslavia to say that even its own status is not yet settled, because the United Nations is keeping this issue open. Since spring last year, Yugoslavia has not been a full member of the United Nations; it was not expelled from the organization, but it is not entitled to take part in meetings of the UN General Assembly. However, the true reason relates to Greece, which demonstrates very good friendly relations toward the Serbs and always defends Yugoslavia's interests in the international arena. Furthermore, as a member of the EU, Greece has much stronger influence in Europe than Macedonia, whose status has still not been determined. Of course, one should not gloss over the fact that Macedonia has also failed so far to recognize the FRY, which was formed from the two former Yugoslav republic of Serbia and Montenegro.

It is evident that there are enough reasons for Belgrade to delay recognizing Macedonia. Accordingly, Yugoslavia will be in no hurry to do so, at least until there is an improvement in the relations between Skopje and Athens.

Klaus Expounds on German, Foreign Relations

AU2202120194 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 21 Feb 94 p 3

[Article by Berthold Kohler: "According to Prague's Head of Government Klaus, a Solution to the Sudeten German Problem Is Now Possible"]

[Text] Prague, 20 February—German-Czech relations are not at their best. The hope that both countries would quickly get closer to each other on the path of reconciliation after the conclusion of the friendship and neighborhood treaty two years ago has not been fulfilled. Rather, stagnation seems to have become the main quality of mutual relations. In particular, the unsolved issues from the time of the war and the immediate postwar period have proved to be a constant strain on the political atmosphere between Prague and Bonn. These include compensation for the Czech victims of Nazism, but also the "Sudeten German problem": the insistence of the Germans driven out of Bohemia and Moravia on their "right to their home."

However, Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus does "not" assess current German-Czech relations as being "as poor as various commentators" in Prague. He does not see "anything dramatic" in the bilateral relations, Klaus says in an interview with this newspaper: "Czech-German relations are as they are. One cannot improve them artificially, but one should not worsen them artificially, either."

Klaus points out that there are hundreds of thousands of contacts between Germans and Czechs everyday. These contacts at the "micro level" are the "meat and blood" of the relations, and they are excellent. The "network of microrelations" today is a hundred times larger than two years ago and a thousand times larger than five years ago. Therefore, he does not see a deterioration of relations—"quite the contrary." Contacts between institutions and governments are not the most important thing, the head of the Prague Government says. At this level, the Sudeten German problem has repeatedly caused displeasure on both sides. The demands of the more than 3 million expellees for a right to return and the return of their property, which Prague had nationalized without compensation after the war, have been categorically rejected by the Czech Government so far. Even talks about this matter were refused. Most recently, Czech Parliament President Uhde categorically refused any kind of discussion on this matter during his visit to Bonn, thus offending his host, Bundestag President Suessmuth.

The Czech prime minister said that the Sudeten German problem is an "unfortunate complication" that has been inherited. "For us, it is quite clear: We cannot solve all of our inherited problems right now. Various inheritances are constants of our life, and solving the problems that arose from the situation during the first days after World War II is part of that. Unfortunately, we cannot accept the undermining of these constants." However, for the first time, Klaus indicated an alternative that might offer a way out of the stalemate. As the head of government says, in the Czech Republic, individual rights have priority over collective rights, and that also applies to looking back into the past. "This is a principle of our interpretation of life and reality." He, Klaus, is quite sure that there will not be any solution for the "collective of the Sudeten Germans": "Such a solution does not exist for me, and therefore it is quite unnecessary to look for one. However, I am quite sure that this problem can be solved at the individual level. At this level, I do not see any problems for the Sudeten Germans."

The head of government says that for him this is a "new concept," the interpretation of which he first must develop further for himself. "The terminology is completely new, and this terminology can lead somewhere. The way out of the stalemate is an individual solution, not a collective one. This is a change in paradigms." However, this also means that the Prague Government will continue to stick to its "no to collective discussions" (with representatives of the expellees).

In Klaus's view, compensation for the Czech victims of Nazism is "certainly the German side's problem." His government is dealing with the short-term question of how much is to be given to the victims as a preliminary advance from the state budget as long as they do not get anything from Germany. As an economist and politician, he understands very well Germany's domestic difficulties in the election year, "at this stage of economic development and in view of high unemployment." Therefore, he does not expect anyone in Germany to be powerful enough at the moment to tackle the issue of compensation.

Klaus says that the same principle as for the restitution of Jewish property or the restitution of church property must be applied to compensation for the victims of the war: "We can only attempt to alleviate the consequences of injustice that someone has suffered." This is a rational and pragmatic concept "that is acceptable for all of us." One must not understand the sums that have been cited "as an objective yardstick of injustice." As regards church property, his government is looking for a mutually acceptable solution. The (coalition) partners must, however, accept that "we cannot turn the world back to 24 February 1948. I cannot find a solution under the flag of the restitution of property," the prime minister said.

The 53-year-old chairman of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), unchallenged in heading the opinion polls, denies that there is animosity toward the German neighbor. In his country, he has never, not even over the past decades, "seen, heard, or found" animosity toward Germany. Still, recently, it was a small surprise for him to hear that the Czech Philharmonic Orchestra, "a jewel of national pride," has a German as chief director. He was taken aback a bit when he heard that. "However, the term 'animosity' really falls into a different category." Of course, Klaus says, matters are different when speaking about fear or fears of Germany. However, it is quite

normal that the smaller entity is a bit afraid of the larger one. Still, this is not an aggressive attitude toward the Germans. "I do not expect anything bad from Germany," the prime minister said.

Klaus does not care to heed warning voices, stemming mainly from historians' circles, saying that the people in Bohemia and Moravia know too little about the multifaceted nature of their German neighbors. He is certain that the Czechs know more about the Germans than 90 percent of the world's nations about their respective neighbors. "Most certainly, our knowledge of German history, literature, and current affairs is qualitatively much better than German knowledge about the Czech Republic," Klaus says. He states that demands for an institute for "German studies" are "lobbyism."

Klaus also rejects the accusation that he is against border-crossing cooperation. The Czech Government is for a maximum of border-crossing cooperation as long as it takes place at the "micro level—that is, the individual, companies, towns, and communities." Prague is not against it when two border towns jointly organize their sewer system. "I have said a hundred times: Fine, do that, more quickly and better than today." However, he is not a friend of regional cooperation. "Regions are something unnatural for us. I always say that we must enter Europe as a whole country and not as the European region of Egrensis, the European region of Neisse, or the European region of the Bohemian Forest."

Klaus says that, after the disintegration of Czechoslovakia, his country is "slowly but zealously" searching for its identity. It is still at the beginning of a process that must be gone through and cannot be anticipated with analytical definitions. The foreign policy goals of the Czech Republic, on the other hand, are completely clear. "We belong and have always belonged to the Central European area, not to the East European area or even to the Balkans." Conclusion are drawn from that, such as the desire to join all important European institutions.

Desirous of becoming a member of the European Union (EU) and, at the same time, being one of the most prominent critics of European "excess bureaucratization"—Klaus does not see any contradiction in that. These are two sides of the same coin. The Czechs have fears that are linked to their past: "We know what integration in a community with a capital that is 2,000 km away means. There are very few opportunities to change things when nonelected bureaucrats sit and have great power." He, Klaus, "certainly does not" compare "the absolute aspects of the EU with Soviet hegemony. However, from the structural viewpoint, there are various things there that I can compare." Recently, he agreed with the president of the European Parliament that the ratio of nonelected officials within the EU must be changed for the benefit of elected officials.

The Czech prime minister also energetically defends himself against the accusation, primarily from Poland, that Prague refuses cooperation with the other Central European states. Indeed, Klaus does not like to use the term "Visegrad" (the informal association of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia): "We speak ofCEFTA (the planned Central European Free Trade Association)." It is the Czechs who are pushing this project ahead and who have problems pulling the others along. The members of the Visegrad Group as well as Germany and Austria are natural partners, with whom one wants to have the best conceivable relations.

And what about Slovakia? Is the relationship with Bratislava already considered "business as usual" by Prague, or is there still a "special relationship"? "A bit of both," the Czech prime minister says. Thus, the dissolution of the common state is already so far in the past for the Czechs that he, Klaus, has forgotten to mention it abroad several times. On the other hand, he regrets the negative developments in Slovakia. At the moment, there is no one in Slovak politics strong enough to overcome the instability there. Unfortunately, one must still wait for a solution to the crisis in Bratislava. In other fields, too, Klaus, who is married to a Slovak, crosses his fingers to the former "brothers": for the Olympic ice hockey game—as long as they do not play against the Czechs, one may assume.

'Freedom Fighters' Insist on Compensation

AU1802174494 Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech 16 Feb 94 p 2

[Article by Jiri Stastny: "According to the Chairman of the Czech Union of Freedom Fighters, the Final Compensation Must Be Paid by Germany"]

[Text] Czech Union of Freedom Fighters [CSBS] Chairman Jakub Cermin yesterday expressed the union's point of view on compensation for former political prisoners during the Nazi era.

The CSBS agrees with compensation in advance from the Czech Republic's funds; however, it thinks that the Federal Republic of Germany should pay the final compensation. It emphasizes that the matter must be dealt with quickly in view of the advanced age of the resistance fighters. Representatives from the CSBS and the Association of Freed Political Prisoners have stated that the sums proposed do not correspond to the sums paid in other countries (5,000 German marks per person per year of imprisonment). At present, this concerns some 8,200 people. It is a fundamental issue of international relations. "We are still the only state that has not been compensated," said Union Deputy Chairman Jan Paroutek.

In 1973, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany was willing to pay compensation to Czech political prisoners according to the same principles as for other European countries. Its goodwill, however, did not meet with a proper response because the German side insisted on payment in German marks targeted on individuals, while our government demanded an overall sum that it would distribute in accordance with its own

rules. The German Government did not accede to this solution. Association of Domestic Resistance Chairman Slavomir Klaban has briefed reporters on an open letter to the chairman of the Czech Republic Supreme Court in which he called upon Otakar Motejl to resign immediately. In March 1970, Motejl rescinded the acquittal of nine citizens sentenced in a political trial in 1954 for alleged treason.

ODA Opposes Proposed Revisions to Constitution

LD1802203794 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1700 GMT 18 Feb 94

[Text] The Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA] rejects the attempts to change the Constitution of the Czech Republic that were made earlier this week at the meeting of the Chamber of Deputies. ODA Deputy Chairman Daniel Kroupa spoke about this today.

[Begin Kroupa recording] The ODA rejects these attacks against our Constitution and considers it fundamental to ask if all parties voting for the Constitution feel committed to defend it against attacks by extremist forces. We think that the attempt to remove the Senate from the Constitution and incorporate into it elements of direct democracy are aimed at creating favorable conditions for these extremist forces taking power.

In this respect, I wish to comment on the matter of referenda. You all know well that the ODA has consistently opposed this institution, pointing out that it disturbs our constitutional balance of power. Just now, when our parliament is debating the proposal of introducing referenda into our Constitution, in Slovakia the referendum might be used to take away the citizens' right to elect. This in fact is the substance of Mr. Meciar's proposal to strip disobedient deputies of their mandate by means of a referendum. It is an almost classical illustration of how direct democracy can be used as an instrument to liquidate democracy as such. [end recording]

Industrial Espionage Effort Against Tamar Radar

AU2102110394 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 15 Feb 94 p 1

[Article by "km": "Certain Arms Factory Reportedly Wanted To Steal Data on the Tamara Radar"]

[Text] Prague—The HTT Group company, the manufacturer of the Tamara passive radar, has registered an unsuccessful attempt at industrial espionage, Ludek Stodulka, vice president of the company, told MLADA FRONTA DNES. Tamara is a state-of-the-art air defense system, which, according to experts, can uncover even the "invisible" U.S. Stealth bomber.

The attempt to obtain secret information on the production of Tamara was supposedly made by a certain Czech arms company. Stodulka did not specify which company it was, nor did he reveal any details about the espionage attempt. He did indicate, however, that the arms company wanted to gain access to information about Tamara by offering jobs to three key HTT Group employees.

Ludek Stodulka also said that this unnamed company, in cooperation with foreign competitors, rendered it impossible for the HTT Group company to export Tamara, which can fetch up to $17 million, to one Persian Gulf country. The competitors supposedly thwarted the long-planned deal, which was to have been the first export of Tamara since 1992, by spreading false information about the radar's abilities.

Numbers of AIDS Cases Reported

LD2002211594 Prague CT 1 Television Network in Czech 1830 GMT 20 Feb 94

[Text] As of today, there are 177 HIV positive people registered in the Czech Republic, and 46 of them have full-blown AIDS; 28 people died. In the past few months, the number of infected women of reproductive age has grown. Experts estimate that the real number of HIV positive people in the Czech Republic is approximately 2,000 to 3,000.

Smallholders Party Leader Views Elections

AU2302100994 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 18 Feb 94 p 7

[Interview with Jozsef Torgyan, chairman of the Independent Smallholders Party, by Lorinc Szendrei in Budapest; date not given: "The Smallholders Will Not Again Yield Precedence to Others—Jozsef Torgyan on Being Qualified as Extremist, Trustworthiness, and the Constitutionality of the Government"]

[Excerpts] Istvan Csurka [cochairman of the Hungarian Justice and Life Party—MIEP] and Jozsef Torgyan will hold a rally on 20 February in the Budapest Sports Hall. Is the right wing the next to join forces after the liberals' agreement and the left wing bloc? A straight answer is not yet forthcoming. [passage omitted]

[Szendrei] Why are you appearing in a joint meeting with Istvan Csurka with whom you have had many debates? It seems that, after the former internal and external allies of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] were expelled from paradise, they now have found each other.

[Torgyan] I do not have 2.1 million forints to give a massive speech in the Budapest Sports Hall. This is why I accepted someone else's invitation. Rather than Csurka, it was Ferenc Morvai, leader of the Citizens' Interest Protection Organization, who invited me. You can see that I am also talking to you, but we cannot at all be accused of having the same political platform.

[Szendrei] You know that an interview is different from a demonstrative political rally. I do not believe that you would also jointly appear with Viktor Orban [chairman of the Federation of Young Democrats] at an event. The electors consider all jointly held speeches to be political gestures. To be naive: Is the meeting of the smallholders and the MIEP really the result of a purely financial constraint, without any intention to cooperate?

[Torgyan] In politics, it is impossible to use the same categoric notions as in mathematics for example. Therefore, the rally organized for 20 February has to be accepted as it is. Nothing needs to be added. For a politician, there can be no greater honor than to talk in front of crowd that is as large as possible. As far as I know, there are 12,000 seats in the Sports Hall, but the experts will set up loudspeakers in the corridors and then as many as 100,000 people will be able to hear us. [passage omitted]

[Szendrei] Whatever way we look at it, Csurka and his party are on the right of the Hungarian political spectrum at the moment. Many people say that the slightly left-wing pre-war smallholders party may shift to the far right under Torgyan's leadership.

[Szendrei] You are using completely different terms from what would be appropriate. Before the war, the smallholders party was indeed a left-wing party—compared with [governor] Horthy's right-wing views. However, right after 1945, we were to the right of communism. Therefore, there is no point in qualifying us or other parties in this way. [passage omitted] We are not extremists. I repeat that we will not meet Csurka, it is only our host that we have common. I will face the challenge. We can assess our abilities in rhetoric.

[Szendrei] I must admit that, even now, you do not give in very easily.

[Torgyan] Thank you. Therefore, I have to enter into this dialogue, just as I do not decline dialogue with other politicians. This is also part of political culture but we do not have any plans to do with Csurka. [passage omitted]

[Szendrei] You are also said to have betrayed the coalition. A government has to be formed after the elections. How certain can the contenders be that you would be a reliable partner?

[Torgyan] I do not think reliability should be approached from this angle. We made a coalition agreement [in 1990, at the previous elections] which, contrary to rumors, was in writing. It was the MDF that violated it. This is the reason we criticized the top leadership. We had a serious debate with [former prime minister] Jozsef Antall because he did not fulfill the agreement. This was his way of repaying the fact that, in the second round, we had withdrawn our candidates in many places in the MDF's favor. Without us, the MDF would not have doubled its votes in the second round.

[Szendrei] In other words, it was the smallholders who helped the MDF come to government and Torgyan helped Antall come to power?

[Torgyan] This is it, precisely. Returning to gratefulness: On the night it came to power, the MDF made a secret pact. I returned home after midnight and was told that a couple had been looking for me. I later realized that these were [then MDF deputies] Imre Konya and Katalin Kutrucz. At that time, they had already signed the agreement with the Alliance of Free Democrats. This is what they were going to tell me. They had made a pact with the opposition behind our backs. Therefore, it is only us who can raise the issue of reliability.

[Szendrei] In other words, the smallholders generously allowed the MDF to win. This time, they will not offer this to anyone, rather, they are certain that they will win the elections....

[Torgyan] That is correct. No one can yet tell the size of the victory. I think it is possible that the smallholders will have an astonishingly big victory. The population is so bitter and they have so much faith in us that even this is possible. If we win the elections at whatever proportion, then it will not be us who has to look for partners. Rather, the partners will be seeking us because people do not like to be left out of power. There are not many Jozsef Torgyans in the world, and I have never been running after ministerial office. [sentence as published]

[Szendrei] Are you so self-assured or humble?

[Torgyan] I said that we were deceived in the coalition, because we had been promised a change of regime, a big clean-up from top to bottom, the return of landed property, and so on. They did not fulfill these promises, and so there was nothing to agree about with those in power. On the contrary! After this, let me ask if those in power who implement a completely different program from what they had promised in their election program are constitutional.

[Szendrei] Do you question the government's constitutionality?

[Torgyan] Election fraud can never be seen as a constitutional procedure anywhere. And this is what the government has done through its politics.

[Szendrei] Where do you, as a jurist, find a paragraph in the Constitution on this?

[Torgyan] That is a different question. What I question is an issue of constitutionality, rather than a political issue. The basic principles of this could be laid down in the Constitution. I think that even a referendum is possible on this issue. Therefore, I restate that this government is in power contrary to the Constitution because it has deceived the electors. If they had said that "the cleaning up means that we will take money from your pockets, we will have dealings with the communists, and we will participate in the communists's preservation of power and assets," and they had received the votes after this, then I would not at all object. In that case, they would be ruling lawfully.

Capitalist Communists

[Szendrei] We can read the public opinion polls and hear the views of politicians and the public that the left wing is becoming stronger. What will the smallholders party do after a left-wing victory?

[Torgyan] This danger does not exist. People who have listened to what I said can see that the communists had been speaking up against the curse of private property until they relieved society from this curse. They made themselves into owners. The former party chiefs would be foolish to return to their party positions.

[Szendrei] What kind of government would you consider to be a strong government in the coming four years?

[Torgyan] We have to start from our program. People cannot bear the insecurity of existence, the level of the loss of assets, and the obvious anguish of unemployment. A government that is able to make fundamental changes will be a strong government.

[Szendrei] Therefore, in your view, the smallholders party will win the elections. As the party's chairman, you may even become prime minister. Do you think that you are the most suitable person to be prime minister?

[Torgyan] Not at all. However, it is a fact that I am the only politician who can mobilize really large masses. In other parties, there are not any charismatic people who are accepted by the people.

Ethnic Leaders From Neighboring States Meet

AU1802141994 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 17 Feb 94 p 7

[Interview with Andras Agoston, chairman of the Democratic Union of Vojvodina Hungarians; Arpad Pasza, chairman of the Democratic Community of Hungarians in Croatia; and Bela Marko, chairman of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania; by Jozsef Botlik; place and date not given: "Vital Issues Over the Border"]

[Text] Last weekend, the leaders of the Hungarian organizations from beyond the border were in Budapest and were met by Prime Minister Peter Boross. We interviewed some participants of the talks on the results of the meeting and on the situation of the various Hungarian national communities.

Andras Agoston, chairman of the Democratic Union of Vojvodina Hungarians [VMDK]: We Want Autonomy!

[Botlik] What were the results of the Budapest meeting for you?

[Agoston] I raised two issues at the meeting, one in connection with the Balladur plan. I explained that, if any of the region's governments signed it in its current form, the political goals set out by the organizations of the Hungarian national communities over the border would in fact become impossible to achieve. We insist that an agreement like this also has to contain the autonomy concept that we drew up. The issue of aid was the other topic. In recent years, the government of the mother country has also given significant financial support to the Hungarian national communities over the border. I asked the prime minister—as help given to the national minorities is internationally legitimate—to help maintain our institutional system, and to support our efforts aimed at implementing our autonomy concept. This would be very important because, certain phenomena in connection with the financial aid we have received did not help this.

[Botlik] The psycho-terror against the some 400,000 Hungarians and the forceful military mobilizations seem recently to have eased off. Does the dialogue that began between the VMDK and the Serbian government have a role in this?

[Agoston] We formulated our autonomy concept two years ago, at a time when the war was in full swing and the forceful mobilizations were daily events, and we had to suffer a tough war propaganda. We started from the premise that it is also in the interest of the Serbian state—including its parties—that the now open and unresolved situation of the Vojvodina Hungarians is settled. We were certain that sooner or later, international circumstances will change to benefit our efforts. In recent months, I also put my talks with Serbian President Milosevic into this context. As a matter of fact, the meeting was requested by Milosevic. I raised the personal autonomy of the Hungarians and that the establishment of an administrative district with Hungarian

majority should begin to be set up in north Backa or the northern part of the Banat. We would like to achieve all this gradually. If the Serbian government backs down from the agreement then we will inform the Hungarian and the international public about this.

[Botlik] What does personal autonomy mean?

[Agoston] We intend to make progress in three areas. In education, we would like to establish a Hungarian schooling system, in culture, we would like to take over the leadership of institutions and associations and their assets (mainly buildings), and we would like to establish an independent Hungarian information system (press, radio, television). All these would be directed by the personal autonomy's council that will be established on a multiparty basis. We will probably initiate elections for this in October. If the promises received during the talks with President Milosevic come true then we will be able to set up the Vojvodina Hungarian press and publishing house and the editorial group of the independent Hungarian television and radio. We can start setting up the Hungarian schooling system, and the council of the personal autonomy can take over certain functions in the area of culture.

[Botlik] At the December elections, five representatives of the VMDK were elected into the Serbian Parliament. From the results it seems that they might be the decisive factors....

[Agoston] Unfortunately, this is the situation in Parliament where the socialists have 123 of the 250 seats and the opposition has the rest. The opposition is a rather mixed political group because the VMDK and Seselj's radical party are together in it although they are not at all in the same camp in reality. The opposition is divided, therefore, the socialists have to prepare for an unstable government and they will again have to call elections after some time. In this situation, our view is that the VMDK's representatives will not vote for any such parliamentary decision which would make them clash with half of the Serbian political palette.

Arpad Pasza, Chairman of the Democratic Community of Hungarians in Croatia [HMDK]: We Pay Attention to the Scattered Hungarian Groups

[Botlik] Out of the organizations of Hungarians over the border, the HMDK is the youngest, it is barely two years old. A large section of the areas inhabited by Hungarians—the Dravaszog [Drava river area] and Slavonia—is under Serbian occupation at the moment and a significant proportion of the population has escaped from these places. How can you organize yourselves in this situation?

[Pasza] We consider the organization of the Hungarians living in scattered areas as our main task. For example, there is a significant diaspora—mainly intelligentsia—in the Croatian capital Zagreb which can still be stopped from being assimilated. A kindergarten group will be started for their children in March. Some 1,200 Hungarians are living in the Tengermellek, they speak their mother tongue but, unfortunately, their children can only speak Croatian. At the beginning of the year, 164 people formed the HMDK's local organizations in the former Hungarian spa Abbazia now Opatija. They have grand plans and they are also expecting a cultural performance from Hungary. We will next form organizations in the area of Belovar and then along the Sava River in Slavon-Brod.

Bela Marko, Chairman of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania: We Also Want To Become Economically Strong

[Marko] Contrary to certain media reactions, we also considered this meeting natural because it has to be openly and consistently admitted that the Hungarian organizations operating in various countries of the Carpathian basin regularly exchange their experiences. All Hungarian national communities over the border are living in special situations but their problems are often similar and, most certainly, this why we came to almost identical conclusions as to the solutions. In our view, the introduction of various forms of autonomy leads to the reassuring settlement of the situation of Hungarian national communities over the border. As we consider ourselves as organic part of the Hungarian nation, we expect the Hungarian Government's political support in our endeavors and that care for the Hungarians living outside the country's boundaries will remain an organic and inseparable part of its foreign policy.

[Botlik] In the past years in Europe, a number of proposals have been made to set up international norms which—it seems—will reassuringly settle the situation of national minority and ethnic communities....

[Marko] The Balladur plan that is now called the European Stability Agreement is one of these proposals that apply to the East European region or a section of it. Its original version contained several positive elements for national minorities but most of these were removed from the draft through the amendments in 1993. This plan would only offer good solutions if, in the process of settlement, the affected national communities and governments also held talks and the views of the national communities were taken into consideration. The latter was emphasized by the ethnic Hungarian leaders at the Budapest meeting. Our links with the Hungarian government are not only of a political nature. We have already received considerable budget support for rebuilding our educational and cultural institutional system. The mother country will continue to be completely open about doing this in the future, too.

[Botlik] What are the most important tasks in improving the situation of the more than 2 million strong Hungarian national community in Romania and Transylvania?

[Marko] The priorities we laid down four years ago are still valid. Unfortunately, the Hungarian Bolyai University of Sciences still has not been able to restart its operation, therefore, our education system continues to be incomplete. We are trying to substitute this with civic social

institutions, foundations, associations, unions, and folk high schools, and there are also very remarkable church initiatives. We are trying to use all legal frameworks and expand the possibilities of Hungarian education to overcome the difficulties and the acute shortage of teachers. As we often said it in our statements, the economy is just as important for us, and we think that we have to do much more than we have done in the past to help the Hungarian national community strengthen financially. Through this, people's serious subsistence problems can be eased, emigration can be reduced, and the general mood can be improved. This is especially important because an economically strong national community is less exposed to the state power. We have to act with more determination in the future because an anti-Hungarian discriminative process can also be seen in the privatizations.

Kozyrev, Olechowski Discuss NATO, Relations

LD2202214294 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1815 GMT 22 Feb 94

[Text] Krakow, 22 Feb—Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev started a two-day working visit to Poland on 22 February. The Russian foreign minister met Andrzej Olechowski in Krakow. Both politicians signed an intergovernment Polish-Russian agreement "on graves and sites of remembrance of victims of wars and repressions."

The foreign ministers began their meeting with private talks, during which bilateral relations and issues of European security were discussed. Later, during plenary talks between delegations of the two states' foreign ministries, new forms of economic and cultural cooperation between Poland and Russia were examined.

After the talks, the ministers signed an agreement in which both sides have undertaken, among other things, to finance protection on their territories of sites commemorating the death and martyrdom of citizens of the other state.

During the signing ceremony, Minister Olechowski emphasized that reconciliation and friendship between the Polish and Russian peoples has become possible through mutual respect for the victims that both peoples suffered from the two totalitarian systems that raged in the 20th century. "In this spirit, the Polish people respect and protect the graves of the hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers who fell and rest on our soil," said the head of the Polish Foreign Ministry, adding that the agreement confirmed the will to permanently respect the resting places of victims of wars.

Kozyrev emphasized that the agreement was an expression of respect for historical truth and the memory of those who gave their lives in the struggle for freedom.

The Russian diplomat handed over to Minister Olechowski photocopies of hitherto secret archival documents from the period of the [1794] Kosciuszko Insurrection and the Targowica Confederacy, including correspondence between Empress Catherine II and Count Ignacy Potocki.

Commenting on the private talks, Kozyrev told journalists that in these they had raised "in private, confidentially and with mutual understanding," issues of European security and cooperation with NATO.

The Russian minister said that at present we should concentrate on "Partnership for Peace," while NATO membership for new states is only one option. "Perhaps Russia too will join NATO, but perhaps there are other options for fashioning a security mechanism, including dialogue in the forums of the existing political organizations," Kozyrev added.

Olechowski emphasized that perhaps in the future there will be no NATO, or perhaps both Poland and Russia will be members of the North Atlantic Pact. "These are options that would suit us best," said the Polish foreign minister, adding, "if it is not going to be possible to build a Europe without divisions, 'Partnership' could lead to only some countries joining NATO."

"I would like a democratic and affluent Russia to be one of the pillars of security and economic cooperation in the future Europe," Olechowski said, adding that this could be furthered by Europe's opening to comprehensive economic cooperation with Russia.

The Russian foreign minister emphasized that he does not want the countries of East-Central Europe to be viewed as a battlefield for spheres of influence. He added that Poland is now an active participant in international politics. According to Kozyrev, in light of this, one could not say that Poland finds itself in a political vacuum.

Referring to the plenary proceedings, Kozyrev said that the Polish side put forward a number of interesting proposals concerning economic and cultural cooperation. He also stated that the Krakow proceedings brought closer the implementation of agreements signed during President Boris Yeltsin's visit to Poland last year.

"Polish-Russian relations are very good; they merely lack friendly everyday substance," Olechowski noted. He added that Poland and Russia, being neighbors, cannot be enemies. On the other hand, they must be partners even if they do not want to be. "The point is that now we want to travel the road from partnership to friendship, and the Poles intend to do this quickly," Olechowski added.

Before meeting Minister Olechowski, the Russian foreign minister viewed exhibits of the State Art Collection at Wawel castle and visited the Wawel Cathedral. Asked by journalists about Polish-Russian cultural links, he said, "Our cultures have never been separated from each other, and this gives me hope. Culture is the spiritual basis on which we could build the future and good-neighborly relations and develop partnership."

Stanislaw Ciosek, Polish Republic ambassador to Russia, told a PAP journalist that the Krakow meeting was important for both sides because it could contribute to "breaking through the temporary cooling down in relations." According to Ciosek, a breakthrough in Polish-Russian relations will not depend on a single act but will take place gradually.

Ciosek emphasized that it would be easier to attain a political breakthrough rather than an economic one, which "costs a lot and has to be costed," while, for it to occur, there must be first and foremost meetings between the heads of governments, economics ministers, and industrialists.

Delegate Assesses Results of 48th UN Session

WS2302120094 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 19-20 Feb 94 p 21

[Interview with Dr. Zbigniew Maria Wlosowicz, Poland's permanent representative to the United Nations in New York, by Sylwester Walczak; place and date not given: "Poland Supports Idea of Establishing a UN Army; Painful Burden of Bosnia and Herzegovina Drama"]

[Excerpts] [Walczak] What is your assessment of the results achieved by the first part of the 48th Session of the UN Assembly? What were the most important decisions that were made?

[Wlosowicz] If it were not for the painful burden of the drama of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the current session could be regarded as peaceful. An atmosphere of cooperation prevailed, even though a lot of emotions were stirred up by the negotiations on establishing the post of a high commissioner for human rights. There was even a point when reaching compromise on this controversial issue seemed impossible. And yet agreement was reached, which is another proof of ideological differences being less and less of an obstacle in the UN's functioning. Initiating a debate on reforms of the Security Council was another significant part of the session—for the first time, a general debate on the issue took place.

A unanimous lifting of economic sanctions against South Africa, with the hope of a permanent breaking with the apartheid phenomenon—that was a historical event.

From Poland's perspective, what is important is the fact that the concept of "countries of economies in a transitional period" obtained recognition in the UN vocabulary. We have initiated the idea. Until recently, Poland was classified as a developed country. That was perhaps nice but it was also impractical because it placed the country beyond the scope of assistance programs from which developing countries benefit. The recognition by the UN of the existence of a group of countries with economies in a transitional period, creates a much more advantageous situation for us. [passage omitted]

[Walczak] What is the fate of the initiative to establish a UN Center for Human Rights in East and Central Europe, which would be headquartered in Warsaw?

[Wlosowicz] The initiative was submitted by [former] Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski during a general debate in October of last year. The Foreign Ministry is working on coming up with a specific formula for the planned center, which could then be proposed to the international community. [passage omitted]

[Walczak] Some proposals have emerged that aimed at extending the list of the Security Council's permanent members, to also include Germany and Japan. Is there anyone to oppose that? Who are the other candidates?

[Wlosowicz] Indeed, even though the concerned countries themselves are acting with restraint, there are ever more views being raised to the effect that Germany and Japan, due to their political and economic positions, should be included in the Security Council as its permanent members. Practically speaking, no one is putting that in question anymore, and a consensus on that issue is emerging.

Yet the opening up of the Security Council to new members gives rise to another problem: Who else should be included? All regions would like to see their representatives as the Security Council's permanent members. Separate from that, proposals are being voiced to extend the Security Council to the level of 20-25 members. Poland does not oppose changes, generally speaking, but its view is that the interest of the countries of East and Central Europe should also be taken into account in the process of restructuring the Security Council. Debate on this issue is just beginning, and no one actually has a rigid position on it. [passage omitted]

[Walczak] What is your position on the proposal to establish a 10,000-strong UN army? The initiative was submitted by a commission set up by the U.S. Congress, whose goal is to examine possible ways of reforming the UN. Is the proposal realistic? Perhaps what would be more realistic is the establishment by the individual countries of special units of rapid deployment that would be ready for action immediately once a signal from the UN came in. What is Poland's position on that issue?

[Wlosowicz] Poland supports the idea of establishing forces that would be at the disposal of the secretary general. The shape these forces will take and the way they will function are the subject of proceedings of a team that has been established especially for that purpose and that also includes a Polish staff military officer. Eighty countries, including Poland, expressed their readiness to form units to participate in such forces. Right now, the biggest problem is not so much a lack of volunteers to participate in permanent UN forces as reservations being made by many countries concerning the secretary general's discretion applied in each case regarding whether the countries' units should be deployed. That could place a serious limitation on the efficiency of future permanent UN forces. On the other hand, the countries' concern for their own troops is understandable.

[Walczak] Is a change of the peacekeeping operations' formula possible without close participation by the United States? As is well known, the Americans do not participate in operations by the "Blue Helmets" because they follow the rule that U.S. soldiers cannot serve under a foreign commander (the U.S. troops in Somalia act outside of the structure of UN forces). During his speech at the General Assembly, President Bill Clinton stated that future peacekeeping operations will have to meet some strictly defined criteria in order for the Americans to participate in them. Doesn't that mean that the United States is unwilling to take part in peacekeeping operations?

[Wlosowicz] We are witnessing increased involvement by the United States not only in direct participation but also in an active formulation of a new concept of "peacekeeping." This process was initiated as early as during the last period of the previous [U.S.] administration. Right now, we are witnessing many U.S. initiatives, including informal ones, like the "contact group for peacekeeping operations," which discussed some practical aspects of those initiatives.

We should keep in mind that the United States will always be interested in peacekeeping operations. That is because practically one-third of the expenditures associated with each of those operations comes from U.S. taxpayers. Therefore, President Clinton's statement should be perceived mainly as an expression of concern about the operations' goal and effectiveness, and only secondarily as a need by the UN to fulfill formal requirements enabling U.S. troops to participate in peacekeeping operations.

[Walczak] The permanent representation you have been in charge of for a year now is famous for its significant political and cultural activity, also beyond the UN. How do you manage to take care of all of the ingredients of this responsible job?

[Wlosowicz] I perceive my mission in very broad terms, and that is also the way I perform it. We must keep in mind that we continue to be at the stage of creating a new image of Poland abroad. So I use every possible opportunity to contribute to that goal. The UN is firmly placed in the realities of U.S. political, economic, and cultural life, and that is why I frequently take part in other forums. Apart form that, the United States is also a country with a huge and influential group of people of Polish origin. There is never too much contact with them.

Foreign Ministry Talks With Russians Reported

LD2202180494 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1700 GMT 22 Feb 94

[Text] Following a private meeting between the foreign ministers of Poland and Russia, Andrzej Olechowski and Andrey Kozyrev, talks between Foreign Ministry delegations began this afternoon at the provincial governor's office in Krakow. Taking part in the meeting are Ambassadors Stanislaw Ciosek and Yuriy Kashlev. According to earlier announcements, the plenary talks are devoted to seeking new forms of bilateral political and economic cooperation. Issues of European security, including the Partnership for Peace initiative, are also being discussed.

The Polish side is also expecting Minister Kozyrev to present a new concept of Russia's relations with the states of East-Central Europe.

The Russian foreign minister is on a two-day visit to Poland, which is taking place in Krakow.

Sejm Committees Adopt Privatization Report

LD1902000494 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1746 GMT 18 Feb 94

[Text] Warsaw, 18 February—On 18 February, three linked Sejm commissions—administration and internal affairs, agriculture and the food economy, and town and country planning—unanimously adopted the report of the internal affairs minister on the implementation of the law of 24 March 1992 on the acquisition of property by foreigners.

According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MSW], the number of applications presented and permits granted—in particular the total quantity of land—gives no cause for social concern. In 1990, the permits for the purchase of land related to 398 hectares, in 1991 to 534 hectares, and in 1992 to 705 hectares. In the view of representatives of the Internal Affairs Ministry, the law allows "in principle for the securing of the interests of the Polish Republic."

In 1992, there ensued an increase in the number of applications for the granting of permits for the purchase of immovable assets by foreigners. There were 1,940 applications received (1,573 in 1991). A treasury fee is charged for the issuance of a permit, and the state Treasury altogether received the joint sum of 10.6 billion zlotys on this account. Two years ago, the MSW issued a total of 112 refusals to grant a permit for the purchase of immovable assets in Poland (31 in 1991).

As was reported, the largest number of permits was issued to foreigners from the FRG, the former USSR, Sweden, and the United States. Among the companies with foreign capital participation, the greatest number of permits was issued to enterprises with the participation of capital from Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, the United States, and Italy. Foreigners most willingly buy land situated in the Opole, Gdansk, Katowice, and Warsaw Voivodships.

Sejm Rejects Walesa's Constitutional Proposals

LD1802195594 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1800 GMT 18 Feb 94

[Text] [Announcer] Today the Sejm rejected the presidential constitutional proposals. The president's press spokesman, Andrzej Drzycimski, acknowledged this to be a conflict between the party-dominated parliament and the president, who wanted to make it possible for all political forces and citizens to have a real role in the discussion on the Constitution. Sejm Speaker Jozef Oleksy addressed the statement by Andrzej Drzycimski during a news conference:

[Begin Oleksy recording] I do not think Poland needs any new conflict at the top, and Poles expect good cooperation from all of the highest bodies in authority in the state, a good mutual understanding of the matters that are most important for Poland, and not conflicts, collisions, rancor, and resentment. I wish to express a

deep conviction that this sort of judgement expressed in the name of the president is an emotional judgement in association with the decision of parliament, and that it will not cast a shadow on the hitherto good cooperation between the president and the Sejm. [end recording]

Oleksy: No Conflict Between Parliament, President

LD1902202394 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1830 GMT 19 Feb 94

[Excerpt] Sejm Speaker Jozef Oleksy said in Czestochowa that Poland did not need a war at the top. This was his comment on the conflict between the president and parliament caused by the Sejm's rejection of Lech Walesa's proposal concerning the procedure of passing the Constitution.

[Begin Oleksy recording] I do not accept that a war at the top has started. I am opposed to this. I think that the president, whose spokesman's statement in a way sent a signal about such war, will think as I do and will make efforts to achieve harmonious cooperation between parliament and the president. Because, I stress, Poland does not need a war at the top. There have already been too many and they have spoiled too much. Poland needs reconciliation and common understanding in order to resolve problems of millions of people. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Strak Says Draft Constitution 'Badly' Prepared

LD2002135794 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 0200 GMT 20 Feb 94

[Text] Michal Strak, the head of the Council of Ministers office, commenting on Lech Walesa's strong reaction to the Sejm's rejection of the presential draft laws regarding the so-called citizens' initiative on the Constitution, said that the president's officials had prepared this initiative badly and no one from the Belweder had discussed the draft with the Polish Peasant Party's parliamentary floor group.

Strak was speaking at a news conference in Gdansk. Earlier, Minister Strak held a meeting with students—members of the Political Ideas Club [Klub Mysli Politycznej]. During this meeting, he said, among other things, that his favorite hero was General Kutuzov, who, he said, slept during political and wartime debates but always woke up at the right moment.

URM Chief on Coalition, PSL, Government

WS2202140094 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 21 Feb 94 p 3

[Interview with Michal Strak, minister and chief of the Office of the Council of Ministers, URM, by Malgorzata Subotic; place and date not given: "Spectacle for a Connoisseur"]

[Text] [Subotic] What actually happened to have caused this sharp kind of conflict after 100 days of what would seem on the surface a harmonious functioning of the coalition?

[Strak] I would put it another way: The fact that so far, on the surface, these conflicts were not visible means we are ruling the country in a responsible manner. Being in power is not about taking the advice of your neighbor with every conflict that might occur.

[Subotic] But the matter has already happened....

[Strak] And it is done with. It is over now.

[Subotic] Exactly. Do you expect a counterattack on the part of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD]?

[Strak] There was no attack in the first place, so there will be no counterattack. Some differences became visible, but to those who were watching the arrangement from the inside, it was no big surprise. First, it was wrong to assume at the beginning of the Cabinet's term that this will be a coalition where everything will go very smoothly, or that the slogan "Let's love each other" will be the coalition's leading slogan. This coalition consists of two independent political bodies. Each of them has its own history, its own problems, and its own political foundations. So there can naturally occur divergences, but I think the will to act together is stronger than those divergences. A coalition is a kind of contract.

[Subotic] But was there not a breach of this contract in the "Kawalec-Borowski case" [former Deputy Finance Minister Kawalec who was dismissed, and former Finance Minister Borowski who resigned]?

[Strak] The outcome demonstrates that there is agreement over such a solution.

[Subotic] And what kind of solution is that?

[Strak] We are waiting for a candidate for the post of deputy prime minister and finance minister.

[Subotic] Does it mean it will be just one person?

[Strak] That is up to the SLD.

[Subotic] You said one could have expected from the beginning that there would emerge differences between the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] and the SLD....

[Strak] The differences that emerged were not only between the PSL and the SLD but also within each of the two structures. That is a new element compared to the Sejm of the previous term. Back then, the main emotions were associated with interparty relationships. Right now, the focus of the emotions is being shifted "inside." We were aware from the beginning that the government's biggest problems would not be with Sejm deputy clubs or opposition parties, because they are definitely weaker, but with its own basis of support.

[Subotic] Meaning?

[Strak] It will be much harder for us than for our predecessors to come to agreement within the coalition.

[Subotic] What is the essence of the heterogeneity within the PSL?

[Strak] The PSL's situation is perhaps better than that of the SLD, even though there can occur different assessments of our policies vis-a-vis rural areas. Theoretically, it is possible to have a view that we are not doing enough for those areas. But other people in turn say we are doing too much. There is nothing wrong with having such differences of opinion. The only question is: How are these differences eliminated? Does it not happen in a way that would endanger the cabinet's stability?

[Subotic] From that standpoint, what is your assessment of the manner in which the coalition crisis was terminated?

[Strak] The coalition's stability remained unshaken, and, from that standpoint, one can say that the parties' leaderships demonstrated sufficient effectiveness.

[Subotic] Who demonstrated greater, as you put it, effectiveness?

[Strak] I would not make any distinctions. We put an end to the conflict together.

[Subotic] So there are no winners or losers?

[Strak] That is right, there are not. The interpretations that appeared in newspapers were written by people who are on the outside. It is their right to think this or that, but it is the governing arrangement that comes out as the only and common winner—it continues to function. If it were to collapse, that would be a common defeat.

[Subotic] Do you really believe, in accordance with what a joint communique had declared, that the governing PSL-SLD coalition is destined to last four years?

[Strak] You know, there are many people who would like us to last that long. If one assumes that the arrangement is not fixed but that it is going to undergo various convulsions—meaning that there will be thunder coming from the volcano but the volcano will not erupt—it is possible to maintain the arrangement for four years. Flexibility is indispensable.

[Subotic] What could prevent this four-year scenario from materializing?

[Strak] A sudden outbreak of social discontent.

[Subotic] On the basis of research and analyses conducted by the government, can it be concluded that such an outbreak is very likely?

[Strak] Not right now. We will rather witness some local conflicts and ones limited to specific groups.

[Subotic] Perhaps you have an idea for an alternative governing coalition with the PSL's participation?

[Strak] Theoretically speaking, other coalitions are possible. But, from a realistic standpoint, there are no alternative solutions for the nearest future. This lack of other solutions should last about four years. Incidentally speaking, it is my observation that society is no longer interested in politics per se. What it wants is normalcy and peace, not spectacles. After the four years during which the nation suffered various setbacks, what society wants right now is that those whom it had elected be in power for some time to come. And if they rule efficiently, they will be reelected.

[Subotic] Yet you did show precisely this kind of political spectacle for several days.

[Strak] I had meetings with Sejm deputies during this, as you put it, spectacle. What is interesting is that not a single question about it was asked. So it was a spectacle for a very small group of connoisseurs. Politics is a bit like an automobile: You get interested in how it works only when it begins to break down.

[Subotic] And this particular automobile, to use your metaphor, has not yet begun to break down?

[Strak] Perhaps something was escaping from the exhaust pipe with too much noise. But I think society had a feeling that everything that was happening did not present a danger of the vehicle coming to a halt.

[Subotic] You did not fear even for a moment that the coalition would collapse?

[Strak] Not even for a moment. It is like in a marriage: Even if you have an argument with your husband, that does not mean you will immediately want to get a divorce.

[Subotic] "Getting rid of Strak" was one of the SLD's preconditions during the conflict. Can the SLD have something against you?

[Strak] You should ask it about that.

[Subotic] My question was: Can the SLD "have something against you"?

[Strak] I cannot be the judge in my own case.

[Subotic] What is actually the story with local governors [wojewodowie]?

[Strak] All of the local governors that replaced the previous ones were approved of in a double way: by both the PSL and the SLD, except for one case. At this point, there are indeed some more new local governors coming from the PSL.

[Subotic] So far, you have dismissed 19 local governors. How many more of them do you intend to replace?

[Strak] In accordance with the rules of the game, one does not disclose one's plans. An old and experienced politician once told me that you should not utter a word until the decision is "officially in."

[Subotic] With regard to the issue of local governors, why do you succumb to local party organizations, primarily the PSL?

[Strak] It would be hard to call it succumbing. Perhaps I have a better understanding than others of a need that has emerged after the most recent elections: For the whole arrangement to function efficiently, what is needed is harmonious cooperation among the government, local governors, and political power centers in voivodships [administrative units]. If the harmony can be introduced without replacing a local governor, I am very satisfied. But if it is not possible to avoid a replacement, then to maintain the disharmony for some time period would be bad for everyone. Parliamentary democracy has its own rules: One cannot limit the functioning of parties only to the central level. After all, these parties have their own structures, which means also their own interests, at the level of voivodships.

[Subotic] So they must be given prizes?

[Strak] It is not an issue of prizes but one of realistic participation in ruling the country.

[Subotic] So you see no danger whatsoever of local party structures really determining who should be appointed voivode?

[Strak] It is too early to talk about it or to disclose details of decisions that are being made. But to say that local party agencies determine everything is an oversimplification. There have been a great many such oversimplifications. But it is a fact that we have granted the local structures the right to come up with their candidates for the posts of voivodes.

[Subotic] Has it ever happened that someone was appointed voivode than what the local structures "came up with"?

[Strak] Yes, it has.

[Subotic] When was that?

[Strak] I do not want to go into that, but I can guarantee you that it really has happened. And, from among the more-than-10 newly appointed local governors, practically only one failed to obtain a positive opinion from local self-governments. Even though we have allowed our party authorities throughout voivodships to influence the process of appointing local governors, it turned out that they are sufficiently good candidates to have gained the support of local self-governments. I should add that majorities within these local self-governments are, after all, composed of supporters of other political parties.

[Subotic] You once said: Seeing the way Solidarity is in power, I am convinced the time will come for the PSL.

[Strak] As early as in 1989, when the revolution was just beginning, during a meeting with activists for the United Peasant Party, someone asked the question of whether the party will manage to defend itself. I replied then that it is not possible for a social group as large as peasants not to come up with their own political representation. A need for the PSL was widely felt. All that was left after that was the issue of political efficiency.

[Subotic] But why did the others who wanted to lead the peasant movement fail—for instance, Gabriel Janowski and Jozef Slisz?

[Strak] We simply proved better. They were not capable of adopting down-to-earth positions: They talked too much and they were not doing enough.

[Subotic] Let us return to the coalition issues. Does Sejm Deputy Pek express the PSL's position on privatization well?

[Strak] Sejm Deputy Pek is the chairman of the Sejm Ownership Transformations Commission; he has access to materials that he studies and analyzes.

[Subotic] But you did not answer my question.

[Strak] I think there is no need to identify the PSL's position with that of Sejm Deputy Pek. By the same token, one could ask a question on whether measures undertaken by me regarding local governors reflect the PSL's position well.

[Subotic] Do they?

[Strak] There is definitely a correlation, even though there is no unanimity, strictly speaking. If you talked to my colleagues, I am sure you would hear as many positive assessments as critical ones of what I do.

[Subotic] But isn't it the case that the negative views prevail?

[Strak] Perhaps they do, but not as much as to manifest themselves in organizational measures.

[Subotic] How would you comment on the view that you are Pawlak's Wachowski?

[Strak] All I can do is have a laugh at that.

Minister Warns About Impact of Strikes

LD2202223494 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1830 GMT 22 Feb 94

[Relayed by Warsaw TV Polonia Network; passages within quotation marks are recorded]

[Text] The government, which today discussed the strike situation, has called on Solidarity to negotiate social guarantees for employees threatened by unemployment. At the same time, the Council of Ministers emphasized that the draft budget, which is soon to be approved by the Sejm, cannot be changed. A complete freeze on energy price rises is also impossible.

[Reporter Marek Kupis] Industry Minister Marek Pol said the government agreed with Solidarity's basic

demand for an increase in real pay. He added that the strike in the mining and steel industries, announced by Solidarity, could weaken the economic position of these enterprises.

[Marek Pol] "This could very strongly affect the weak economy of the mining sector. That is apart from the issue of energy security of the state. We all depend on energy; we all depend on coal. This could very strongly affect the entire Polish industry and what all employees at all enterprises are going to feel."

[Kupis] Labor Minister Leszek Miller has called on the trade unionists to hold talks and halt strike actions.

[Labor Minister Leszek Miller] "If the Solidarity trade unionists decide to discuss the housing reform program, social benefits, problems of unemployment, or other issues that are vital for thousands of Polish families, I can confirm again that there is an open place at the negotiating table."

[Kupis] According to Public Opinion Research Center research, in September one Pole in four thought that the situation in the country was going in the right direction. In November, there were 20 percent more optimists. But in February the level of optimism fell below that of September.

[Miller] "Well, the honeymoon is slowly coming to an end. I am thinking of good relations with the government and an influx of public expectations. This, as far as I remember, applies to every government team. And now the dull daily life begins."

[Kupis] Ministers maintain that the government will now have to prove that the election slogans about an economic policy with a human face were not merely empty promises.

Need for Effective Deportation Method Discussed

WS2202151194 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 22 Feb 94 p 2

[Article by Zbigniew Lentowicz: "Unwanted Immigrant May Fly Away"]

[Text] Internal Affairs Minister Andrzej Milczanowski announces that as early as March we will try to send back the first "cumbersome" foreigners by plane. In line with the ministry's estimates, there would be at least 1,000 unwanted immigrants. "We know where they are, what they are doing, what their origin is; after all, this is what the police is for," says Longin Beirzanek, a high-ranking officer at the Main Headquarters. "It is theoretically possible to start a deportation action," he adds; "however, it would have to be precisely coordinated by the police, the voivodship administration, and the border troops. Otherwise, we might see a situation which has already taken place in Gdansk; there were talks with a group of Romanian Gypsies, living in the city refuse dump; travel documentation was prepared, and even medical tests were made. However, the next day the Romanians disappeared—they most probably went to a neighboring voivodship.

"We still do not have an efficient system for the deportation of unwanted foreigners," reiterates Tomasz Kozlowski, director of the Office for Migration and Refugees in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The director is not even going to suggest that foreigners threaten to cause some kind of an apocalyptical catastrophe in Poland; he says, however, that every country must have an effective method of disposing of foreigners who do not respect the Polish law, for instance. However, the truth is that voivodes are rarely able to fully implement their own decisions concerning deportations. Kozlowski argues: "Certainly no one in the Polish Republic is going to plan any mass deportations; this is an absurd idea; all the same, the authorities must not be so helpless."

The police have forwarded nearly 40 deportation motions to the Zielona Gora voivode; in almost all cases, administrative visas were placed in the passports which obliged their owners to leave Poland by the shortest route. No one knows which routes those persons chose. Only six foreigners were escorted by a convoy: four to Okecie airport, two to the eastern border. In all, the expeditions cost 49 million zlotys.

In order to avoid such expenditures, the police in Zielona Gora increased supervision over foreigners arriving in the areas close to the border. Whenever a more numerous group appears, the functionaries immediately check their documents and scrupulously implement registration regulations. "No one can accuse us of persecuting anyone; however, after such a reception, the guests do not usually stay long," assures Wiktor Szopski of the Voivodship Police Headquarters, who is the author of this method. He suggested, however, that this danger not be exaggerated. In the Zielona Gora Voivodship, which is located on the immigration route, there are not more than tens of so-called cumbersome foreigners. Last year guests from abroad committed 116 offenses here, of which at least 30 percent were road offenses. In these statistics first are the Ukrainians, followed by the Germans. "This is really not much," say Szopski. The Szczecin voivode issued 120 administrative visas last year; he already deported 18 foreigners. According to the voivode's spokesperson Maria Bartczak, the problem has not reached a level which would be alarming to the voivode. Lublin Police Spokesperson Andrzej Przemyski is not as optimistic. According to him, the present deportation procedure is unacceptable: Within 48 hours the entire case must be completed, even though it takes a lot of time to merely establish the identity of the detained person; it is common for them to destroy their documents. The police in Lublin has already prepared its own deportation arrest location (there will be 20 such places all over Poland); however, it is not certain whether this arrest location will be used: some provisions of the 1991 Law on Foreigners have been queried by the Constitutional Tribunal; it did not agree that the state administration be given the right to

send people to closed places. The verdict of the judges of the Constitutional Tribunal was then confirmed by the Sejm; now we must wait for deputies to meet their commitment and amend the law soon. The amendment bills aim at strengthening the supervision over the cases of detainment related to deportation, by giving the right of supervision to the prosecutors' offices.

Only when the new law is passed will we be able to think about establishing a center where deported foreigners—with their families—would be able to wait until the procedure is completed; in line with the agreement on readmission, signed by Poland, this procedure allows for appropriate international agreements. Longin Bierzanek believes that it would be best if such a center were located in the center of Poland, near Warsaw, where it is only a short distance to the airport at Okecie and to the interested embassies.

Last year voivodes made over 1,000 decision on deporting foreigners; only 617 unwanted foreigners were escorted by convoys to the border. According to police estimates, it would not be unfounded to deport from Poland at least 2,000 most cumbersome Gypsies, among whom many cases of tuberculosis were detected, and just as many foreigners from the east, who make deals conflicting with the Polish law. "If the Romanians were sent with escort to their homeland, they would not survive the winter there," protest Poles in the committees for defending Gypsies in Poznan.

Miners Break Off Talks; Cosma To Be Sued

AU1902194994 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1800 GMT 19 Feb 94

[Text] Negotiations between representatives of the Ministry of Industry and the delegation of the Lignitul [Brown Coal] Mining Trade Union Federation of Targu Jiu resumed at the ministry's headquarters this morning, with the only issue still pending being the consent of the Industry Ministry to suspend the management board of the Targu Jiu Brown Coal Public Corporation for the duration of investigations that are going to be conducted by a ministerial inquiry commission.

At approximately 1215 the negotiations broke off with the intent to resume an hour later. Meanwhile, the trade union delegation went to the Bucharest headquarters of Romania's Mining Trade Union Confederation. At 1400 correspondents waiting for the resumption of talks at the Ministry of Industry were asked to go to the headquarters of Romania's Mining Trade Union Confederation, where Mr. Dumitru Leonte, vice president of the confederation, said that since the delegation did not have the mandate to sign the protocol in the drafted form, it renounced to negotiate any further and left for Targu Jiu to present the document and discuss it with the other trade union leaders.

A commission of the Ministry of Industry is expected to arrive in Targu Jiu next Monday, 21 February, to investigate—in the light of repeated demands made in this respect by the miners—the activity of the management board of the Brown Coal Public Corporation. Mr. Dumitru Leonte emphasized that the commission should include experts of the control bodies of the Ministry of Industry, the Prime Minister's Office, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, and the Ministry of Finance. He ruled out the presence in the inquiry commission of any member of the management board of the Targu Jiu Brown Coal Public Corporation, our correspondent Catalin Trandafir reports.

At the request of the correspondents, a news conference was held at the headquarters of the Targu Jiu Brown Coal Public Corporation, with the participation of Messrs. Gheorghe Marculescu, prefect of Gorj County; Radu Mironovici, general manager of the aforementioned public corporation; Colonel Constantin Codica, chief of the Police Inspectorate of Gorj County; and Gorj Deputy Nicolae Mischie.

After a presentation of last week's events, following the strike launched by the Lignitul Mining Trade Union Federation of Targu Jiu, the speakers pointed to the illegal nature of that labor action and emphasized that in the coming days, a governmental commission will begin its inquiry into accusations brought against the management board of the public corporation, while representatives of the Court of Public Accounts will conduct their own inquiry. We are open to any kind of checks, General Manager Radu Mironovici said. Answering the correspondents' questions, he gave details about the relationship between the trade unions and the public corporation. On the other hand, the management board of the Targu Jiu Brown Coal Public Corporation will conduct its own inquiry into damages caused by the strikers over the past five days of labor action and will take steps to recover these damages and punish the guilty ones.

The head of the Police Inspectorate of Gorj County again emphasized the illegal nature of the strike and said that the leaders of the Lignitul Mining Trade Union Federation of Targu Jiu have been penally punished in the past for violating the law. He said that legal steps had been initiated against Miron Cosma, who will be sued for serious abuse [ultraj] after the indictment is finalized by the Targu Jiu Prosecuting Magistracy and forwarded to the appropriate court, our correspondent Titus Stoichitoiu reports.

Union Leader Pins Hopes on Commission Inquiry

AU2002144094 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 20 Feb 94

[Text] On his return to Targu Jiu, Nicolae Mihu, leader of the Lignitul Mining Trade Union Federation, told our correspondent Titus Stoichitoiu that he is totally disappointed with the negotiations that were conducted in Bucharest last Friday and Saturday [18-19 February]. In spite of all that, he is optimistically looking forward to the arrival in Gorj County tomorrow of the governmental inquiry commission scheduled to investigate irregularities in the activity of the Brown Coal Public Corporation, which might lead to the strike being ended. Otherwise, Mr. Nicolae Mihu said, the coordinating council of the Lignitul Mining Trade Union Federation intends to continue the strike action in the mining units and to explain to the miners that they should no longer go to Targu Jiu, as Miron Cosma demanded from them last Friday night.

PSM, PRM Attacks on Iliescu Examined

AU2202115794 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 19 Feb 94 p 1

[Ion Cristoiu editorial: "The Blackmailing of Ion Iliescu"]

[Text] Yesterday the Socialist Party of Labor [PSM] and the Greater Romania Party [PRM] issued statements to the extent that they are freezing the negotiations with the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR] on forming a coalition of the red pentagonal [five party ruling coalition of PDSR, PSM, PRM, the Romanian National Unity Party-PUNR, and the Agrarian Democratic Party of Romania-PDAR]. In a more explicit manner (PSM) and a more discreet one (PRM), the two members of the majority coalition let it be understood that they are ready to question their further backing of the current government in Parliament. Despite the fact that the two statements are issued by different persons, they are quite

similar. In fact, the similarity is so striking, that it becomes obvious that we are dealing here with a concerted action of the two parties, or better said of the two outstanding Ceausescu apologists in the respective political groupings: [PSM Vice President] Adrian Paunescu for the PSM and [PRM President] Corneliu Vadim Tudor for the PRM. Both texts are dominated by a lyrical style. In this respect, they are not so much official statements, as elegies. At least PRM's letter, through its size and sighs, is reminiscent of Alecu Russo's "Song to Romania." As far as both PSM and PRM are concerned, the two statements are a good opportunity for a little demagoguery. In the case of PSM, it is slightly more temperate. It is quite likely that the text written by Adrian Paunescu was retouched by the pragmatic politician Tudor Mohora [PSM vice president]. However, PSM's letter reaches some unheard of peaks of electoral demagoguery. The party leadership does not limit itself to stating that it is freezing the negotiations with the PDSR; it also feels the need to present, under signature, a picture of the current Romanian society that smacks of the kind of proletarian cultism that even Ana Pauker and Iosif Chisinevschi [post-World War II Stalinist leaders of Romania] would have been ashamed of. The letter talks about old people scavenging through garbage cans for food, while the rich are dancing and partying at will. It is obvious that the initiator and author of the letter forgets that the paupers he weeps for include the peasants of Butimanu village, whose land was taken away from them by Corneliu Vadim Tudor. Likewise, Corneliu Vadim Tudor ignores the fact that he himself is one of the newly rich, who are spending their time moving from one binge to another. If it could talk, the rooms of "Select" restaurant [patronized by PRM officials] would have a lot to say in this respect.

The two statements also have the same goal in common. Both the PSM and PRM criticize the PDSR and President Ion Iliescu because the latter do not take steps against certain people who are considered as deadly enemies of the two parties. From the PSM letter we learn that an agreement has been reached with the PSM to replace [Defense Minister] General Niculae Spiroiu. If we take into account a previous article by Corneliu Vadim Tudor, from which we learn that Adrian Paunescu has asked the minister of national defense not to draft his son for military service, we immediately realize why a whole party is trying so hard to overthrow Niculae Spiroiu. The minister of national defense has pissed off Adrian Paunescu because he did not agree to do the PSM vice president this service. Something that Adrian Paunescu was not prepared to tolerate, particularly since the minister of defense during Ceausescu's reign had acceded to his request not to draft him in the army. Mind you, this happened at a time when even Nicu Ceausescu was forced to do his military service. In its turn, PRM is very mad at Ion Iliescu because he did not immediately order the arrest of Niculae Spiroiu, Petre Roman [president of the Democratic Party (National Salvation Front)], Traian Basescu [former minister of transport and deputy of the Democratic Party (National Salvation Front)], and Traian Chebeleu [Ion Iliescu's spokesman]. Not because the latter were guilty of something, but because they dared to contradict Corneliu Vadim Tudor. We are obviously dealing here with an ordinary attempt to blackmail Ion Iliescu. As I said, Adrian Paunescu and Corneliu Vadim Tudor are behind the two statements. Two profiteers of the Ceausescu regime, who in the previous system have become accustomed to having all their absurd whims satisfied, including the wishes to topple various public people only because they had at one point had the temerity to stand up to them. The two statements are a new proof of the huge proportions to which certain Ceausescu apologists were blown up in these trouble times.

Swedish UNPROFOR Troops Near Tuzla Injured

AU2202181094 Paris AFP in English 1757 GMT 22 Feb 94

[Text] Stockholm, Feb 22 (AFP)—Five Swedish UN soldiers were injured Tuesday [22 February] when a grenade struck their tank north of Vares outside Tuzla, northeast Bosnia, the Swedish defence ministry said Tuesday.

Four of the the soldiers suffered shrapnel wounds, while one suffered eye injuries, Swedish defence ministry officials said. They were transported by helicopter to a Norwegian field hospital outside Tuzla.

It is not yet known who was responsible for the attack. Both Serbs and Moslems hold positions in the area.

It also uncertain whether the tank was targeted or hit by accident, Swedish defence ministry officials said.

Serb Involvement Not Clear

LD2302121194 Stockholm Radio Sweden in Swedish 1130 GMT 23 Feb 94

[Text] The shooting against Swedish UN soldiers in Bosnia yesterday came from a Bosnian Serb area, the chief of the Nordbatt [Nordic Battalion] staff, Alf Bjoernsjoe stated today. He cannot definitely establish that Serbs were responsible for the incident. The five Swedes hurt in the shooting are well and expected to be able to return to service in Bosnia.

UN 'Very Close' to Air Strikes

AU2202204894 Paris AFP in English 2043 GMT 22 Feb 94

[Excerpt] Sarajevo, Feb 22 (AFP)—The UN came "very, very close" to ordering air power against warring parties in Bosnia Tuesday [22 February] after five UN soldiers were wounded when a mortar shell struck their tank, a senior UNPROFOR official said here.

General Jean Cot, commander of the United Nations Protection Force in ex-Yugoslavia, told journalists that "it is only because there was no absolute means of determining the origin of the shell that it was not possible to use the (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) air force."

An official at UNPROFOR headquarters here told AFP that "we came very, very close to using air power." [passage omitted]

'New, Powerful' Serb, Croat Offensive on Maglaj

AU2302103094

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 23 February reports the following situation in the republic:

"Powerful assaults by the chetnik and ustasha criminals on the free Maglaj territory have been going on since 0730 [0630 GMT] this morning," Hajrudin Sermic, the correspondent from Maglaj, reports. "In the southern sector of defense, the chetnik and ustasha forces have been attempting a tank-infantry breakthrough in the region of [words indistinct]; northward in Plane, the chetniks are attacking from several directions. Several hundred artillery shells have been fired, but the knights of the 201st Brigade would not be taken by surprise. They adamantly repelled the attack, although new waves of attacks continue."

Civilian targets in the town and suburbs have also been exposed to intensive destruction by scores of tank and howitzer shells, as well as volley fire from mortar batteries. After extensive preparations and concentration of manpower lasting several days, a new, powerful offensive on Maglaj definitely began this morning. The commander of the criminal chetnik army Stankovic cries: "This is the beginning of the end for Maglaj and Mt. Ozren." So Sermic concludes his dispatch.

"Sporadic but powerful shelling of the defense lines of the free Brcko territory continues," reports Hamiz Deronjic, the correspondent for that area. "The enemy directed the fiercest mortar attacks yesterday and overnight at defenders' positions in the central part of the front and on the Kladje-Djukici line. A recoiless gun has opened fire on Djukici on several occasions. The chetnik guns situated in Potocari pounded central parts of Brcko's defense with [word indistinct] shells. More overflights of the enemy helicopters have been registered in the air corridor above Brcko over the last 24 hours."

Volunteers Defending Maglaj

AU2302115994 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 23 Feb 94

[Hajrudin Sermic report from Maglaj]

[Text] Horrendous attacks of the chetnik-ustasha forces along the entire separating line on the Maglaj front are intensifying by the hour. The chetniks and ustashas are receiving reinforcements from Zepce, Doboj, Prnjavor, and Mt. Ozren. This are definitely the most powerful attacks so far with only one goal—to conquer Maglaj.

The fighters of the 201st [Hill] Brigade have halted their further advances toward the town. An appeal by the Maglaj War Presidency and the Command of the 201st Hill Brigade of the Bosnia- Herzegovina Army to the residents that they immediately and urgently place themselves on the rim of the town and prevent the enemy from capturing Maglaj has borne fruit. Volunteers, representatives of the civilian authorities, more than 50 mothers, and even wounded soldiers are reporting to participate in the crucial battle for Maglaj. They could not be prevented in this even by the hundreds of artillery shells fired at the town and several dozens of civilian casualties. The Maglaj is being defended heroically from the heart for who knows how long.

Modern, Russian Arms Arriving in Bosnia

AU2302141894 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 23 Feb 94

[Text] The press center of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army advises that the presence of the Russian arms has been increasing on the Bosnia-Herzegovina battlefields. Beside some modified dated types of arms, some very modern arms have been arriving on this battlefield recently. At the end of January, a convoy consisting of eight trailers sent from Russia crossed onto Bosnia-Herzegovina territory near Raca, carrying arms for the needs of the aggressor's chetnik army. The trailers contained Elipton bombs—most likely the arms that Zhirinovskiy referred to during his visit to the so-called Srpska republic, alleging that this was the new secret weapon of great destructive power—a surface-to-air missile of unknown type, and antiaircraft guns of Russian manufacture.

When the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina started in April 1992, the former Yugoslav Peoples' Army disposed of three missile surface-to- air systems, namely: SA-2 [Guideline], SA-3 [GOA], and SA-6 [Gainful]. We have received confirmation from several sources that the aggressor has strengthened its antiaircraft defense over Bosnia-Herzegovina considerably and introduced missile systems that not even the former Yugoslav Peoples' Army had before the war. All these systems are of Russian manufacture, namely: SA-8 [Gecko], SA-9 [Gaskin], and SA-14 [NATO code name not known]. The SA-13 (Gopher] and SA-11 [Gadfly] also form part of the aggressor's antiaircraft defense. These systems are supported from the territory of the so-called Yugoslavia by SA-12 [Gladiator] missiles.

A new missile antiaircraft system has appeared on Mount Bjelasnica and Mount Igman last year that was not identified.

The presence of a giant (Cumen) 240-mm caliber mortar, whose bombs weight 130 kg, has been observed at several places throughout the Bosnia-Herzegovina battlefield. The (Cumen) fires destructive chemical and nuclear bombs, which means that it does not use classic mortar grenades. Its barrel is 5.5 m long and its range is 9.5 kilometers. The giant weapon weighs 4 tonnes. This mortar was also spotted in positions around Sarajevo.

Bearing in mind the number of destroyed tanks on this battlefield and the number of tanks held by the army of the so-called Srpska republic, it is evident that their hardware is regularly replenished. Tanks that had earlier not even formed part of the armament of the former Yugoslav Peoples' Army, for example, T-72 tanks, have appeared on this battlefield on several occasions. These tanks, which carried the colors, the markings, and the numbers of the Russian Army have also taken part in some of the battles, the press center of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army reports.

Together with these arms, large contingents of men have been arriving who are servicing them and training members of the chetnik artillery units. It is also well known that contingents of fully armed and equipped mercenaries are arriving on the territory of the so-called Srpska republic at regular intervals. They are not stopped on the Russian border, nor are their equipment and arms seized, the press center of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army reports.

Serbs Reject Conditions for Opening Tuzla Airport

LD2202191394 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1903 GMT 22 Feb 94

[Text] Novi Sad, Feb 22 (TANJUG)—Aleksa Buha, the foreign minister of the Bosnian Serb republic (RS), said on Tuesday that the talks on reopening the airport in the Moslem enclave of Tuzla should shortly begin and that this had already been discussed with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaliy Churkin in Sarajevo.

"However, the conditions for reopening the airport cannot be those proposed by French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe," because "his scenario for RS is unacceptable," Buha told Novi Sad radio.

Juppe has said that the west would even use force to reopen the Tuzla airport and threatened the Bosnian Serbs with NATO air strikes if they oppose this.

"Isn't the experience of the Sarajevo ultimatum sufficient warning to Mr. Juppe," Buha asked.

NATO threatened to launch air strikes against the warring sides in Sarajevo unless they withdraw their heavy artillery around Sarajevo to 20 km or place them under U.N. control but, in practice, these threats were directed against the local Serbs only.

However, the Bosnian Serbs started pulling out their heavy weaponry from around Sarajevo on Friday only at the initiative of Moscow and after it guaranteed to deploy its U.N. troops along the separation line with the Moslems.

The Bosnian Serb Republic agrees to reopen the Tuzla airport only if it receives guarantees that it will not be used to supply the Moslems with arms.

Ultimatum 'Unacceptable' to Serbs

LD2202162294 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1539 GMT 22 Feb 94

[Text] Novi Sad, 22 Feb (TANJUG)—Talks on opening Tuzla airport are expected to start soon and this was discussed in Sarajevo with Vitaliy Churkin, Russian deputy foreign minister, Aleksa Buha, the Serb Republic's (RS) foreign minister, told Novi Sad radio today.

"However, the opening of Tuzla airport will be permitted under the conditions somewhat different from those proposed by French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe,

for his scenario is unacceptable for the RS. The French foreign minister has clearly indicated the West would like to apply the Sarajevo recipe, in the form of a NATO ultimatum, in the case of Tuzla airport. Was the experience of the Sarajevo ultimatum not sufficient for Mr Juppe?", Buha said.

Serbs Shell Tuzla Airport Area

AU2202170194 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 22 Feb 94

[Salih Brkic report from Tuzla]

[Text] The chetnik shelling of the region around Tuzla is continuing. Last night and all today the Mt. Majevica chetniks have been pounding Vukovije and Dubrave with heavy artillery. They are firing the shells from the area of Poljanice on Mt. Majevica, and they have destroyed or badly damaged some dozen houses in Vukovije and Dubrave. It is obvious that the criminals from Mt. Majevica are showing that they are ready to fire at [Tuzla's] Dubrave Airport, which the world wants to open.

The general alarm has been sounded three times in Tuzla, and it is still in force.

Everything that has been happening around Tuzla these days shows that the decisions of the international community that Tuzla become a protected area are for the chetniks only a dead letter.

Report Criticizes Tolerance of Rights Abuses

AU2202134594 Paris AFP in English 1331 GMT 22 Feb 94

[Text] Geneva, Feb 22 (AFP)—The international community has tolerated massive violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in Bosnia-Hercegovina, according to a strongly-worded United Nations report released Tuesday.

"The conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and in particular in Bosnia-Herzegovina have once again proved that human rights only play a secondary role in the context of international politics," the latest report by the UN Human Rights Commission's special rapporteur commented.

Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the former Polish prime minister who has been compiling reports on former Yugoslavia since August 1992, said humanitarian efforts had not compensated for what he termed "political inertia" and called for the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to be allowed to intervene more actively.

"A number of formal steps which have been undertaken may be considered as a substitute or excuse for political inertia.... The enormous efforts and sacrifices of the field officers of the various international agencies have not compensated for that policy," he argued.

"Such a policy undermines some of the most fundamental principles upon which international law and the system of human rights protection have been built," he concluded.

Mazowiecki acknowledged that he had not been able to achieve his main objectives of offering effective assistance to victims and of reducing the massive scale of the violations of human rights and urged that UNPROFOR be given a more active mandate.

"UNPROFOR forces have not been effectively empowered to intervene to protect against human rights violations as they occur and have been forced to observe passively many serious breaches of international humanitarian law owing to the inadequacy of their mandate and resources."

He particularly accused Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats of exploiting humanitarian aid "as an element in a political game."

Although aid continues to get through by road, there are frequently massive delays at Bosnian Serb checkpoints, he noted.

He also denounced the plan for Bosnia put forward last September by the international mediators Thorvald Stoltenberg (UN) and Lord Owen (European Community), saying the proposals for partition represented "an absolute repudiation" of his most basic recommendations.

Mazowiecki, who published five reports last year, emphasised that "this warning has been ignored by the international community" and that all this time, ethnic cleansing has continued without any respite.

Silajdzic Interviewed on Ultimatum Results

LD2202182994 Berlin N-TV in German 1620 GMT 22 Feb 94

[Interview with Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic by correspondent Roger Horne in Washington on 22 February; Silajdzic speaks in English with superimposed German translation—recorded]

[Text] [Horne] I am very glad to welcome the Bosnian prime minister here at N-TV. Dr. Silajdic, are you, after the talks you have held here in Washington today, and after the expiry of the ultimatum, more optimistic?

[Silajdzic] Yes, the American involvement in this initiative gives us hope. We believe that Bosnia is a global issue. It must be viewed globally by the international community and, as far as that international community is concerned, the United States plays a leading role. We therefore believe that we are closer to a solution than before.

[Horne] How do you see the Russian involvement?

[Silajdzic] Well, I think they have tried to come in rather late to remain there in that theater. They were undoubtedly much more committed to the Serb side than we had expected. They are therefore lacking in objectivity in some cases, it has to be said.

[Horne] Are you nevertheless not very disappointed over the fact that NATO and the UN needed nearly 23 months for the ultimatum and that so many people had to die in the meantime?

[Silajdzic] Yes, we have expressed our opinion about that. We think that whatever is lost in Bosnia also applies to the rest of the world. Much is at stake here—democracy, human rights, humanity, in short, civilization. We believe it is time to state: better late than never. This applies to those forces in Bosnia that are fighting for democracy and against aggressive nationalism, which stand for order and do not embody chaos and dictatorship. We expected the world to help us fight this evil, but as I already said: better late than never.

[Horne] But, nevertheless, what are your expectations now? The fighting continues, heavy weapons encircle Tuzla, Bihac, Srebrenica, and Mostar?

[Silajdzic] We expect a peace settlement, a comprehensive peace settlement that would ultimately make it possible to withdraw those heavy weapons from the encircled towns in Bosnia. But the main issue is the establishment of a permanent peace, not an unjust, but a just peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The latter cannot consist in moving guns 20 km away, for Sarajevo and other towns remain besieged. The point is to establish peace without rewarding aggression and genocide. I stress this once again most strongly, for this is important, as we will otherwise serve as an example for future adventurers and petty dictatorships.

[Horne] Are you at all capable of still trusting people like Milosevic and Karadzic, or do you believe that only force can bring a peace agreement?

[Silajdzic] Trust people like them? I think they only recognize force, just like any classroom bully who understands only force. That is why we think that this NATO decision has made it quite clear that force works.

[Horne] Talking about force, did you receive any guarantees from the U.S. Government as far as the deployment of ground troops operating under the UN flag is concerned?

[Silajdzic] Well, within the implementation, yes. Because a serious implementation of the peace plan is not possible without international guarantees. I believe that the international community has much at stake in Bosnia. The implementation has to take place with full NATO support. The UN, more or less by decree, guarantees the status quo. It is neutral, whatever that means. This has proven counterproductive so far. For this reason we have to change the situation in Bosnia and other parts of Europe. What counts is the credible threat of force: that is now proved to be working.

[Horne] You have problems not just with the Bosnian Serbs but also with the Croats. There are efforts at present aimed at bringing the both of you back to the negotiating table together with the objective of creating a bloc against the Serbs. This has already been attempted, although in vain.

[Silajdzic] Yes, you're right. Why didn't it work? Because there was a basic assumption of the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina between the Serbs and Croats. This made agreement impossible, and the concept has to be changed entirely. This is not 1939, when Bosnia was divided between these two. There must be a very serious attempt to reconsider this concept and to accept the fact that Bosnia is not a territory for grabs, but a state and must be dealt with that way.

[Horne] Mr. Prime Minister, what do expect in the humanitarian sector from Europe now, and more precisely from Germany?

[Silajdzic] Well, unfortunately we have to continue that and I'm afraid that we are facing a dramatic humanitarian crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We don't want to be the welfare recipient, the international welfare recipient here. But we must consider that, because it is the guilt of the European nations that things happened this way. We had an arms embargo, we could not defend ourselves, so now they must have a welfare state on their hands. We will try to get out of this situation as soon as possible. As for Germany, they have taken care of a lot of our own people and we do appreciate that fact.

[Horne] Mr. Prime Minister, many thanks and best wishes for the people in your country.

Conditions Set for EC Administration of Mostar

AU2202153794 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 22 Feb 94

[Report by Omer Vatric from Mostar]

[Excerpt] Is peace closer to Mostar after Sarajevo? To judge by the frequent visits by international representatives, one would say that better days are ahead for Mostar. There is less and less firing in the city, and the talks on establishing an EC [European Community] administration over Mostar have been stepped up.

Last night (Albert Benabu), UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] head for civilian affairs, held talks with members of the Mostar War Presidency, while today they held two hours of talks with (Fernando Sanchez Rau), head of the Spanish mission, and (Morris Mono), head of the French mission. Smajl Kvaric and Alija Alikadic, representatives of the Mostar authorities, stressed that the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities in Mostar supported the efforts of the EC to establish an EC

administration over Mostar, but under certain conditions, which they had detailed last night in a written reply to General (Bo Pelvas), special envoy of Mr. Stoltenberg.

These conditions are as follows: Mostar has to be an open city, and it cannot be a part of the Croatian republic of Herceg-Bosna, nor its capital; conditions have to be created for the return of the refugees and displaced people; in order for talks to continue with the Croatian side under international auspices, free entry of all humanitarian convoys has to be guaranteed, electricity has to be supplied to the eastern part of the city—which has been without electricity for eight months—water has to be restored, the Ploce-Mostar-Sarajevo humanitarian corridor has to be opened, medical evacuation of the seriously wounded from the city has to be allowed, [word indistinct] hospitals, medical and civilian premises have to be respected, and all prisoners have to be released. [passage omitted]

Mladic Dismisses Rumors About Resignation

AU2202153494 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 19 Feb 94 p 9

[Report by D. Pejak: "The General Laughs at Rumors About Resignation"]

[Text] Jahorina, Feb—General Ratko Mladic, commander of the general staff of the army of the Srpska republic, has not appeared in public for some time. This has caused all sorts of speculation. Along the right bank of the Drina, "the well informed" were even saying that Mladic had resigned. In a conversation with our correspondent on Mt. Jahorina [near Sarajevo] recently, the general first laughed at that and then explained the reasons for his absence:

"I was not there because I was busy with obligations at the front. In this situation, I do not want to be very much present in public, because in this way, people get used to individuals. And there are some personalities who possess more authority, so let us rather have them in the public eye. I am doing my job as well as my knowledge, capabilities, abilities allow, together with my associates. What matters is that there are some evident results of this," Mladic said.

Replying to the observation that the term "withdrawal" is very much present in this war, Mladic said the following:

"Withdrawal has never brought luck to anybody. We have to free ourselves from the Serb syndrome that by withdrawing in 1915 and 1916, we achieved our aims. I am not saying that this was right or wrong. However, in that war there were some sort of tactics and 'stop-go' strategies. They experienced a disaster. One should only compare a withdrawal with this 'stop-go' strategy and draw a conclusion. It is clear what should be done: One should only look straight ahead and walk straight on and up. I do not know what withdrawal means. Withdrawal can take place in a way at a moment when the war chaos in the regions of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina and the former Yugoslavia is settled by political means, when the hatchets are buried by those people who have dug them out and have set off to attack the Serbian people, when they withdraw their declaration of war on the Serbian people, when they express a real wish for peace and put their signature to it. Only then can we return our weapons to our barracks and get ready in case a new holocaust befalls the Serbian people."

Radars Arrive in Sarajevo for Source Detection

LD2102162494 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1524 GMT 21 Feb 94

[Text] Belgrade, 21 Feb (TANJUG)—Two radars for the detection of the location of artillery fire have been flown to Sarajevo airport, TANJUG learned today from Belgrade UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] headquarters.

The radars will "cover" Mt. Igman and the territory northeast and southeast of Sarajevo and will be able to locate the positions from which the cease-fire is violated, it is learned at the Belgrade UNPROFOR headquarters.

UNPROFOR radio reports that after a long period of tension a certain sense of relief is felt today in Sarajevo and that General Michael Rose has said that the warring parties in the former Yugoslav Republic [of Bosnia-Herzegovina] have placed 268 artillery pieces under the "blue helmet's" control at nine locations.

Serbs Overpower UNPROFOR Troops, Seize Bridge

AU2202174094 Paris AFP in English 1728 GMT 22 Feb 94

[Text] Zagreb, Feb 23 (AFP)—Two contingents of UN troops have been placed on alert after Serb forces overpowered peacekeepers to seize a bridge linking Croatia and Bosnia, the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) said here Tuesday [22 February].

Around 100 armed Serb soldiers and police took control of the bridge on the River Sava Friday, overpowering a United Nations control post manned by Nepalese troops.

Two battalions of Jordanian UN troops and part of a contingent of Argentinian peacekeepers in north-central Croatia were placed on alert, said UNPROFOR spokesman Matthew Nerzig.

UNPROFOR commander in Yugoslavia, General Jean Cot, threatened Saturday to order the use of force to regain control of the bridge linking Stara Gradiska, Croatia, and the Bosnian town of Bosanska Gradiska.

UNPROFOR deputy commander, John MacInnis, travelled to the region Tuesday to prepare a report on the situation for Yasushi Akashi, UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali's special representative in ex-Yugoslavia, said Nerzig.

A high-ranking UNPROFOR officer told AFP Saturday that, if the Serbs from the self-declared Serbian republic of Croatia (Krajina) refused to withdraw, the UN was in a position to "exert armed pressure on them, encircle them and block their movements."

Western military sources here said the Krajina Serbs could have been supported by Serbian forces from northern Bosnia in seizing the bridge.

The Croatian Serb agency ISKRA reported the takeover by a unit of Krajina's "special police" Friday.

UNPROFOR To Deploy More Troops

AU2302113194 Paris AFP in English 1110 GMT 23 Feb 94

[Excerpts] Zagreb, Feb 23 (AFP)—A French unit of the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] is to be deployed Wednesday around a bridge on the border between Croatia and Bosnia blocked by about 100 secessionist Serbs for almost a week, UNPROFOR said here. Two contingents of UN troops, comprising Jordanians and Argentines, were placed on alert Tuesday because of mounting tension at the site.

About 100 Serb police and soldiers have held the bridge over the River Sava since they overpowered a UN control post manned by Nepalese troops on Friday. The bridge links the Croatian town of Stara Gradiska and the Bosnian town of Bosanska Gradiska.

The UN secretary general's special envoy in ex-Yugoslavia Yasushi Akashi viewed the Serbs' seizure of the bridge as "unacceptable" and was exploring "various ways" to end the stand-off, UNPROFOR said in a statement. [passage omitted]

UNPROFOR meanwhile reported "repeated attempts" Tuesday to shell the strategic Maslenica Bridge in southern Croatia, without saying which side was responsible. It said this constituted "one of the most serious violations" of the ceasefire concluded in mid-December by the Croatian Army and secessionist Serbs.

Croatian media Wednesday accused secessionists from Krajina of having bombed the Meslenica area Tuesday, wounding two people.

The Maslenica bridge, which the Croatian Army recaptured from Serb secessionists during an offensive in January 1993, is vital to Croatia because it links the ex-Yugoslav republic's northern and southern parts.

RSK Demands Equipment Withdrawal

LD2202183094 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1748 GMT 22 Feb 94

[Text] Belgrade, 22 Feb (TANJUG)—The government of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] today lodged a protest with the Zagreb-based UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] command because UNPROFOR lined up combat and technical equipment at its disposal along the Okucani-Sava bridge road near Stara Gradiska, whose barrels are directed toward the bridge, ISKRA [official Krajina news agency] reported this evening.

The Krajina Government demands that UNPROFOR withdraw all combat equipment within 24 hours, upon receipt of this demand, ISKRA reports.

To this effect, a meeting between representatives of the Krajina government and UNPROFOR should have been held today—but UNPROFOR representatives informed through mediators that they would not be coming due to fears for their personal safety.

The RSK Government considers the failure of UNPROFOR representatives to show up as extremely frivolous, and the reasons stated as suspicious and provocative, the Krajina Government protest says, adding that the demonstration of force by UNPROFOR causes a feeling of fear among the Krajina population living on the territory of western Slavonia. The people of Krajina know well where the danger comes from and expect UNPROFOR to be deployed there, not on a bridge that connects the Serb people, the protest says in conclusion.

Army Protests to UNPROFOR Over Serb Shelling

LD2202182294 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 22 Feb 94

[Text] The political department of the Croatian Army's operational zone of Split has reported that the Serbs

repeatedly attacked Croatian Army's positions in the Zadar hinterland today. At around 1200, they fired several mortar shells on Kasic and Lakici. Between 1300 and 1420, they fired around 10 artillery shells on the Maslenica area. At the same time they also fired on Novigrad.

The Croatian Army has protested to the UN Protection Force over these Serb attacks, the strongest in the last three months.

Tudjman Criticized for Minimizing WWII Crimes

LD2202202994 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1807 GMT 22 Feb 94

[Article by Miodrag Dundjerovic]

[Text] Belgrade, Feb 22 (TANJUG)—Croatian President Franjo Tudjman who has, "through a third party", apologized to the Jews for having minimized the number of their victims in the Second World War, could have shown a similar gesture of good will towards the Serbs, too, because he had grossly falsified the data also on their pogrom in the same historical period.

"Serbs and Jews like to have lots of dead," said Tudjman and in line with this thesis he stated the figures on their persecutions, adjusting them to the current "home policy".

The ustashi, Croatian fascists, whose symbols have been adopted by the new Croatian authorities, during the Second World War killed about one million Serbs, Jews and Romanies on the soil of the then Nazi puppet "independent state of Croatia" (NDH).

Tudjman's apology has been purely a formal letter communicated "through a third party" in Washington last Monday to representatives of a few Jewish organizations.

Not only that it was long overdue and not sent to all addresses, but it was also obvious that Tudjman's letter had been prepared for daily political requirements.

The apology was written at the point when the announced sanctions against Zagreb were being prepared and when the deadline set by NATO to withdraw Croatia's regular army troops from Bosnia-Herzegovina was expiring. The apology proved to be "a success" as there were no sanctions, nor have the Croatian regular army troops pulled out of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In his letter, Tudjman repented of having expressed a doubt, in his book "Wastelands of Historical Reality," that six million Jews had been killed during the Nazi holocaust in the Second World War .

As a historian, Tudjman asserted that "no more" than 900,000 Jews were killed in the Second World War.

Tudjman stated in his apology that he had written a "scientific" book while he was a political convict (is it a justification) and that (only now) he understands the "detriment" of some chapters in his book.

Tudjman is the author of the allegations that about 30,000 people had been killed in the ustashi death camp of Jasenovac on the soil of the "independent state of Croatia" (NDH). Tudjman communicated this "knowledge" in 1991, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the NDH.

According to reliable data, in the Jasenovac concentration camp, Croatian fascists had killed 700,000 Serbs.

According to Jewish sources, 20,000 Jews had been killed in Jasenovac and according to Romanies' sources, about 80,000 Romanies were killed in this camp.

Tudjman arrived at the figure on the victims in Jasenovac on the basis of the Nazi documents issued in the days of the Third Reich—the German state responsible for the crimes against humanity.

But, if he had consistently adhered to all German documents, he could have easily found the data by the German commander for the southeast, Lt.-Gen. Alexander Lehr who stated the figure of 400,000 Serbs killed in the NDH territory in April 1943.

Tudjman could have also found a statement by Edmund Gleiz von Horsten, who, from the reports received from Jasenovac had inferred that the "number of the slaughtered Serbs was 750,000."

Finally, in order for the apology to be really sincere and taken as well-intentioned, Tudjman should have shown by his deeds that he had given up state symbols and state policy of the Nazi NDH.

The continuity of the NDH has not been interrupted even today as may be confirmed by international organizations' data saying that 300,000 Serbs have been expelled from Croatia and 10,000 Serb houses destroyed in the latest war.

Granic To Meet With Kinkel, Andreatta 23 Feb

LD2302111994 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 23 Feb 94

[Text] Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic will be on a brief official visit to Bonn, Rome, and Geneva today. Granic will meet German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel in Bonn and Italian Foreign Minister Beniamino Andreatta in Rome. Croatian Foreign Minister Granic will address the UN Commission for Human Rights in Geneva tomorrow.

Markac Appointed Deputy Interior Minister

LD2202212794 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 22 Feb 94

[Text] Republic of Croatia President Franjo Tudjman has decided to appoint Mladen Markac as deputy minister for internal affairs. The decision takes effect today.

Crvenkovski Ready for Negotiations With Greece

AU2202210694 Paris AFP in English 2050 GMT 22 Feb 94

[Text] The Hague, Feb 22 (AFP)—Macedonian Foreign Minister Stevo Crvenkovski stressed here Tuesday [22 February] that his country was prepared to hold negotiations with Greece on all aspects of embargo-tainted bilateral relations.

The offer, repeating a similar one made Monday, came hours after the European Commission sent a letter to Athens demanding an explanation for the controversial trade blockade it imposed last week against the Former Yugoslav Republic. Crvenkoski said Skopje had never called for an end to negotiations with Athens and was "ready to continue them at any time."

Crvenkoski, who is on a two-day official visit to the Netherlands, said his country was ready to talk over "all aspects of bilateral relations" to try to normalise links. "Nothing can be ruled out," he added.

The EC, currently headed by Greece in the revolving six-month presidency, is using a mixture of threats and offers of mediation to get Athens to abandon its hard-line policy, which poses an unprecedented problem for the 12-country union.

Tuesday's letter started a procedure which could end with the executive Commission taking Athens to the European Court of Justice.

The letter to Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, signed by Commission President Jacques Delors, expressed "serious concern about the legality of the measures taken by the Greek Government" and asked it to indicate what measures it would take to resolve the situation.

Athens last week blocked all trade to Macedonia [the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] through the northeastern Greek port of Salonika, which handles most of the country's imports including oil, and subsequently tightened the blockade to include frontier posts.

Greece justified the move by citing Macedonia's "continual provocations and growing irredentist intransigence" and claims that Macedonia has territorial ambitions in the northern Greek province of the same name.

Most of Greece's European Community partners recognised Macedonia before Greece took over the EC presidency in January.

EU Delegation Arrives in Skopje To Mediate

AU2302124994 Paris AFP in English 1230 GMT 23 Feb 94

[Text] Skopje, Feb 23 (AFP)—A European Union delegation headed by Dutch Foreign Minister Hans Van der Broek arrived here Wednesday to mediate a dispute sparked after Greece slapped a trade blockade on Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM].

Van der Broek was to meet with Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov before heading to Athens where he was to try to persuade Greek officials to lift their eight-day blockade against the former Yugoslav republic.

Greece's partners in the 12-member European Union have threatened to take Athens before the European Court of Justice unless the dispute is resolved.

Athens announced on February 16 that it was blocking all trade to Macedonia through the northeastern Greek port of Salonika, which handles most of the country's imports including oil.

Greece justified the move by citing Macedonia's "continual provocations and growing irredentist intransigence" and claims that Macedonia has territorial ambitions in the northern Greek province of the same name.

Greek Foreign Minister Carolos Papoulias said Wednesday that Athens wishes to have good relations with Macedonia but the latter must accept the "logical" demands made by the Greek Government.

Greek Embargo Causes Standstill in Border Traffic

AU2302090994 Skopje MIC in English 22 Feb 94

[Unattributed report: "Trucks Still Blocked"]

[Text] At the Greek border point Evzoni, on the Macedonian-Greek border, numerous trucks still remain blocked by the Greek authorities, due to the trade embargo.

For already the fifth day, cargo vehicles from Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], but also from a number of European Union member states, are waiting to exit Greece. The measure introduced by the Greek Government have grounded vehicles transporting a range of goods.

What will happen to them will be known after the European Union meeting, as there are no official explanations from the Greek side, which only adds to the indignation of the drivers.

'Accusations, Threats' of Ethnic Serbs Viewed

AU2202171794 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 22 Feb 94 p 4

[Commentary by Aleksandar Damovski: "Serbian Political Branch Office in Macedonia"]

[Text] After a brief "consolidation of its ranks," the new leadership of the Democratic Party of Serbs [DPS] in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], finally came out in public at a news conference for the Macedonian media (the first one was

organized only for reporters of the press of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). And all of a sudden, in conformity with a political beginning aimed at impressing its membership that it is "resolute in the struggle for the rights of the disadvantaged Serbs in Macedonia," we heard accusations and threats from the new DPS leadership.

At the news conference held two days ago by the DPS leaders there was an overwhelming wish to be provocative, to express hatred for the country where they live and work (except for party president Dragisa Miletic, who works in Pristina). The Serbian media and the DPS leaders in Macedonia are consistent in using the temporary name of Macedonia in the United Nations. For them, the only legitimate president of the Serbian people everywhere is Slobodan Milosevic. In the event of war on the territory of Macedonia the DPS would call for the defense of only Serbian property and the orthodox brothers "who deserve it." Moreover, in accordance with its ambition to be the only legitimate representative of the interests of the Serbian national minority in Macedonia, the DPS has already studied the possible reaction of the Serbs in the country to possible NATO air strikes in Bosnia-Herzegovina—attacks against the U.S. troops in the state. "The problem of reintroducing the Serbs and Montenegrins in the Constitution is burning slowly, but it could easily become a conflagration that could consume all of us." This was the first threat conveyed by the DPS to the Macedonian public. The second went like this: "We shall wait a while longer, and then the people will have to decide what happens then." Once again in the name of the people, one of the DPS hawks Stojan Trajkovic said: "Any use of the territory for intervention in former Bosnia-Herzegovina will be lethal for the FYR Macedonia."

Well-known threats, well-known propositions and the twisting of facts... but in the spirit of the chosen recipe of the policy of our northern neighbor—Serbia. There was a short-lived shift of the party's policy to take account of the actual situation in the country where this political subject is registered, and then the activities resulted in personnel changes and shifts in the party's course toward northern political orientations. The previous DPS leadership succeeded in recognizing the peril of that orientation and changed its course and behavior in relation to the Macedonian authorities. The new leadership is again at the beginning of the road that repeatedly coincides, not by chance, with the new settlements of the Balkan situation. Whenever a settlement seemed near, one of the main roles was always played by the political leadership of Serbia which, despite the public manifestations of the DPS, apparently plays an important role in all that. The aim, once again, is very transparent and is to be expected from that type of politician—apprentices. The Greek blockade has nothing to do with them, nor does the wish to destabilize Macedonia. For them Macedonia is the FYR Macedonia, but parallel with that, there is the strong wish to introduce Serbs and Montenegrins to the constitution of a state by the name of the Republic of Macedonia (although it is not yet clear whether as a national minority, a nationality, or certainly, as a people). For them, the fact that there are 300 U.S. soldiers in Macedonia means that Macedonia is "a U.S. protectorate and its puppet state."

All this would be welcome in moments of appropriate assistance to orthodox brothers in the "south Vardar regional unit" and in the reestablishment of the "interrupted orthodox vertical axis."

No matter where they may be on the territory of former Yugoslavia the "emotional Serbian people" are sensitive to injustice. The political leaders therefore have no choice. Until then, the provocations and irritations of everybody's emotions remain the main political strategy of these political branch offices.

Parliament Caps Funds for Defense Spending

AU2202191294 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 22 Feb 94

[Excerpts] The State Chamber today determined the funds for education and defense, which form integral parts of the 1994 budget. Amendments to the Citizenship Law have been passed, too. Vesna Burnik reports:

[Begin Burnik recording] [passage omitted] Let us now concentrate on the most important decisions of today which will also have political consequences.

The funds for education are known—27.5 billion tolars will be spent over the next six years on educational buildings, improvement of computer literacy, textbooks, school food, and foreign languages. [passage omitted]

The State Chamber has irrevocably ruled that not more than 76.6 billion tolars will be spent on investments in defense over the next 10 years. It was also decided that the Defense Ministry will be allowed to spend a maximum of 8.8. billion tolars per year. This decision was supported by present deputies of the United List, the Liberal Democratic Party, the Democratic Party, and the Ecological Party, who also opposed the government proposal of defense funds which would amount to slightly less than 85 billion tolars that will be mostly spent over five years. The government coalition has again split on this issue, as the Christian Democrats and Jansa's Social Democrats voted in favor of the government proposal and against the lower sum. [end recording]

Minister Issues Protest

AU2302090694 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 22 Feb 94

[Text] Following the vote on defense funding, [Defense Minister] Janez Jansa in his function as president of the Social Democratic Party sent an open letter to Dr. Janez Drnovsek, prime minister and president of the Liberal Democratic Party [LDS], in which he points out the violation of the principles and provisions of the coalition agreement.

In the letter he informs Dr. Drnovsek that during his visit to the South African Republic, LDS deputy Janez Kopac announced his opposition to the government amendment that increased the so-called Defense Tolar, and that defense funds have been capped by 6 billion tolars, which allowed the budget to remain within the limits outlined in the budget memorandum.

Jansa warns that the Social Democratic Party, besides some social demands, also made its support for the budget conditional on the passing of government amendments. The parliamentary decision—enclosed with the letter is a computer printout of the vote—in his words directly influences state's safety, social development, and the pace of drawing closer to the European Union and NATO.

On behalf of the Social Democratic Party, Jansa therefore asks Drnovsek whether the coalition agreement is still valid, that is to say, whether the LDS will propose changes. He also asks whether the coalition will withdraw the 1994 budget proposal and start a new coordination round or whether the entire procedure was merely a farce aimed at reducing defense funds as much as possible. He also asks Drnovsek about future measures to secure at least relatively normal functioning of the coalition. At the same time Jansa asks him to convene a meeting of all the coalition partner leaders as soon as possible.

Maritime Police Impound Croatian Fishing Boat

AU2202174794 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 22 Feb 94

[Report by Robert Rakar]

[Text] The Slovene maritime police at approximately 2015 [1915 GMT] last night stopped the Croatian fishing boat Ucka, which was dragging a trawl, a mile into Slovene territorial waters. The policemen tried to take the boat into Piran Bay, however, its captain, 28-year-old Zvonko Vincekovic from Opatija, resisted this. For this reason the trawl was dropped into the sea and the boat was taken to Piran by force.

The policemen decided to impound the Croatian ship and prosecute the captain. The Croatian fishing boat probably trawled for the first time as there was no catch on the deck.

This morning a Piran magistrate judge levied a 70,000-tolar fine upon Vincekovic, which he refused to pay. The boat is thus still anchored in Piran Bay.

This incident, the second this year, took place on exactly the same spot as the incident from a month ago that was deemed hushed up. Namely, on that occasion policemen released the offender; however, on this occasion they acted in accordance with the Fishing Law.

Federal

Prime Minister Discusses 'Useful' Visit to UN

LD2202172194 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1501 GMT 22 Feb 94

[Text] Belgrade, 22 Feb (TANJUG)—Radoje Kontic, prime minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, who returned from New York today, said at a news conference at the Federation Palace [in Belgrade] that his visit to New York was useful and essentially achieved its objectives.

Speaking about numerous meetings he had in New York, among them with UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali and with ambassadors of the Security Council permanent member states and other prominent UN figures, the Yugoslav prime minister emphasized the efforts Yugoslavia was making for a peaceful resolution of the Yugoslav crisis.

Prime Minister Kontic received support for the Yugoslav position—that the planned NATO military action in Sarajevo could threaten the peace process in Bosnia and bring about an escalation of the crisis—during his talks with the Brazilian ambassador, who is also the president of the UN Sanctions Committee, the Nigerian ambassador, and in his numerous talks with representatives of influential UN members such as Japan, India, EU countries, and with well-known journalists.

Calling for a more aggressive and organized approach by our country in attempts to break through the information blockade, Kontic appealed for a stronger offensive by the Yugoslav media in presenting the truth about Yugoslavia and about our country's humanitarian needs caused by the vast numbers of refugees of all nationalities who had found refuge here. Only our reintegration into the United Nations can make a full contribution toward peace in the Balkans, Kontic stressed.

With the exception of the official representatives of the American administration, who he did not meet, most of the officials with whom he held talks showed understanding and willingness for the lifting, that is softening, of the sanctions against our country, Kontic said. Sanctions were described as counterproductive and inhuman, as an expression of the international community's inability to influence the resolution of the crisis through political means.

The first concrete result of my visit to New York, Kontic said, will emerge in the humanitarian sphere. Due to the hitherto lack of knowledge about humanitarian needs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Under Secretary James Grant promised aid for Yugoslav children to the tune of several million dollars. While waiting for the sanctions to be lifted, Yugoslavia will, more easily than before, be able to secure raw materials for medicines, about which Prime Minister Kontic spoke with Butrus-Ghali, among other things.

At his news conference, Kontic expressed pleasure for the timely deployment of UN peace forces on positions around Sarajevo from where the Serbs withdrew, thus preventing the escalation of the conflict. He described the NATO ultimatum as: Knocking on an open door, because back on 6 February Bosnian Serbs and UN Secretary General's envoy Yasushi Akashi reached an agreement on the withdrawal of heavy weaponry around Sarajevo and an agreement on that was later reached by Bosnian Serbs and Muslims.

Speaking about a meeting with IMF representatives, Kontic said that this international institution did not change its attitude toward the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but underscored the need to maintain constant contacts with the IMF because of this institution's importance for Yugoslavia's economic recovery and development.

The Yugoslav prime minister positively assessed his talks with representatives of our emigrants in the United States, who displayed significant interest in providing help for the stabilization program.

Albania's Decision on 'Spy Planes' Protested

LD1802185894 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1753 GMT 18 Feb 94

[Text] Belgrade, 18 Feb (TANJUG)—The Federal Foreign Ministry today presented a demarche to the representative of the Albanian Embassy against the Albanian Government's decision to allow the stationing of U.S. spy planes in Albania and Albania's readiness to place its airports, sea ports, and other facilities at the disposal of NATO forces for possible military intervention in the region.

According to the ministry, the Albanian diplomat was informed about the Yugoslav Government's deep concern and was told that such moves on the part of the Albanian Government were aggravating tensions in the region and presented a threat to the security of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The Albanian Government was demanded to re-examine its decision on the stationing of U.S. spy planes and placing its territory at NATO's disposal, in the interest of peace, stability, and the normalization of Yugoslav-Albanian ties.

Nikola Sainovic Appointed Vice President

LD2202154894 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1426 GMT 22 Feb 94

[Excerpt] Belgrade, 22 Feb (TANJUG)—Federal Assembly President Radoje Kontic has decided to appoint Nikola Sainovic, the hitherto president of the Government of Serbia, vice president of the federal government, the Federal Information Ministry reported today.

Sainovic will, in his capacity as vice president of the federal government, coordinate work on the implementation of a program for the reconstruction of the monetary system and the economic recovery of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. [passage omitted]

Doctors Warn of 'Devastating' Sanctions

LD1902065494 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0031 GMT 19 Feb 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Geneva, February 18 (TANJUG)—A delegation of Belgrade doctors have warned representatives of international humanitarian organizations during a several days long visit to Geneva about the alarming effects of the United Nations (U.N.) sanctions on the health of the population and the over 700,000 refugees in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The doctors on Friday ended a visit to humanitarian organizations which operate within the U.N. system. Speaking at a press conference in Geneva, they underscored that the most elementary medicines and conditions for treating patients were lacking in hospitals in Yugoslavia because of the sanctions.

Head of Belgrade's neuro-psychiatry hospital Prvoslav Markovic warned that the admission of mental patients had increased four times in the past six months, and that, because of the sanctions, the genocidal conditions in the hospital wards were more devastating than the atom bomb which dropped on Hiroshima.

Dusan Velimirovic said that since the U.N. embargo was imposed, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had become a country with the biggest number of coronary seizures in the world because mortality in these cases had risen to 50 percent of all mortality rates.

Post-operative infections at the children's clinic in Belgrade have increased by 20-30 percent because there are no antibiotics, Dusan Scepmvic warned.

As a result of the shortage of cytostatics, the mortality of children with tumors has increased 40 percent, and operations are performed selectively, depending on the stages of the cancerous disease, Scepanovic said.

Serbia

Draskovic Advocates Extending Sarajevo Model

AU2302110094 Vienna KURIER in German 23 Feb 94 p 4

[Interview with the head of the Serbian Renewal Movement, Vuk Draskovic, by Sibylle Hamann in Belgrade; date not given: "'Extend Example of Sarajevo!'"]

[Text] [Hamann] You say that you would rather go to Sarajevo than to Pale, the center of the Bosnian Serbs?

[Draskovic] My people are not only situated on the hills around Sarajevo, but are also living in the city. Since the beginning of the war there have always been more Serbs in Sarajevo than around the city—and they suffer more. This is the wrong place and the wrong time to side with the Bosnian Serbs demonstratively.

[Hamann] Do Bosnia's Serbs no longer deserve any support from Belgrade?

[Draskovic] By destroying Sarajevo, Karadzic has destroyed Serb tradition. He does not represent the Serb nation, merely an extremist minority. I belong to a great nation; it is my duty to defend the honor of the Serbs. But the propaganda is in the hands of the extremists.

[Hamann] Is peace in Bosnia possible as long as Milosevic is president of Serbia?

[Draskovic] Do not be surprised if Milosevic and (Croatian President) Tudjman present themselves as peacemakers now. This is not logical, this is not honest—but this is politics. I am worried that the world might forget that the key to peace lies in Bosnia itself. The international community has the duty to extend the example of Sarajevo to all of Bosnia, until the ultimate aim, disarmament down to the knives, has been achieved. This would require 50,000 UN soldiers.

[Hamann] What would the effect on Serbia be?

[Draskovic] After disarmament in Bosnia, the democrats in Serbia and Croatia will grow wings. New people will be in power here overnight.

[Hamann] But people are hardly prepared to bring the regime down.

[Draskovic] How could they? The sanctions have not harmed Milosevic, but me. Of my supporters, 300,000 have fled Serbia. If the West wants to support democratization, it will have to lift the embargo.